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American law of transfers in fraud of creditors traces its origin
to the Statute of 13 Elizabeth.' This enactment, neither the first nor
the last of the English statutes,2 was adopted in whole or in part
by a number of the American states.3 It is said to have been only a
statutory declaration of English common law,4 and as such to con-
stitute a part of our English legal heritage.5
Ohio's contribution to this branch of the law rests mainly upon
two statutes 6 or groups of statutes. The older of these is Ohio Gen-
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Ohio State University.
' STAT. 13 ELIZ. c. 5 (1571); GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND
PREFERENCES § 61b n. (1940).
2 See 50 EDW. III, c. 6 (1376); 3 HEN. VII, c. 4 (1487) (fraudulent gifts
of chattels); 27 ELIz., c. 4 (1585); 39 Euiz., c. 18, § 31 (1597) (protecting
subsequent purchasers of land); Voluntary Conveyance Act, 1893, 56 & 57
VICT., c. 21; Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 GEO. V, c. 20, §§ 172, 173 (present
English statute); BIGELOW, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 11-14 (rev. ed. 1911).
3 BUMP, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 8 (4th ed. 1896).
4 See Hoffman, Burneston & Co. v. Mackall, 5 Ohio St. 124, 133 (1855);
Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 35 A. 2d 831 (Del. Ch. 1944). Cf. MAY, FRAUDU-
LENT CONVEYANCES 6 (2d ed. 1887).
5 Hall & Farley v. Alabama Terminal & Imp. Co., 143 Ala. 464, 39 So.
285 (1905); BIGELOW, op. Cit. supra note 2, at 14, 23. In the Northwest
Territory a law adopted in 1795 from the Virginia code provided that Acts
of the British Parliament, enacted prior to the fourth year of the reign of
King James the First, in aid of the common law, should be the rule of
decision. 2 REV. STAT. c. 64 (Chase 1833). This law was later modified and
repealed. 1 REV. STAT. C. 89, § 4; c. 100, § 23; c. 131, § 7; c. 70, § 2; c. 105, § 2.
A later statute of similar purpose, enacted on February 14, 1805, was re-
pealed on January 2, 1806. 1 REV. STAT. C. 105, § 1; c. 122 (Chase 1833);
SWAN, REV. STAT. 435 n. (Derby ed. 1854); SWAN AND CRITCHFIELD, REV. STAT.
660 n. (1860).
6 Other statutes are: OIno GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 8404-8406 (transfers of
title under the Sales Act); 8617 (trust deeds); 8619 (loans of goods and
chattels); 8560 (mortgage of chattels); 9394, 9400 (insurance policies);
10502-6 (dower); 10290, 10291, 11819 (attachments); 10510-49, 50 (sales by
executors); 11092 n. 29 (insolvent estates); 11102-11103-1 (sales in bulk);
11224 (limitation of actions); 11781, 11782 (proceedings in aid of execution);
11894 (appointment of receivers); 13125, 13125 (penal code) (1938).
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eral Code Section 8618, enacted originally in 1810 7 and described as
being coextensive with the Statute of Elizabeth.8 Next are Sections
11104-11107, first enacted in 1859 as an integral part of the law on
administering assignments for the benefit of creditors, which autho-
rize the appointment of a receiver to recover illegal preferences and
fraudulent conveyances "for the equal benefit of creditors." 9
With the variation in doctrine produced by divergent interpre-
tations of state statutes, need arose for uniform legislation on the
subject of fraudulent conveyances and for clarification as well as
change in local rules. To these ends 10 the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act was drafted-approved by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1918. It was not intended that the Act
7 8 Ohio Laws 216 (1810) (Section 2 of the Statute of Frauds). While
the statute provides that a conveyance in fraud of creditors "shall be utterly
void and of no effect," such a conveyance is usually held to be valid as be-
tween the parties. Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio 469 (1824); Webb v. Brown,
3 Ohio St. 247 (1854); Pride v. Andrew, 51 Ohio St. 405, 38 N. E. 84 (1894).
This is the general rule. BUMP, op. cit. supra note 3, § 432; BIGELOW, op. Cit.
supra note 2, at 466.
8 Brice v. Myers, 5 Ohio 121, 123 (1831); Huwe v. Knecht, 10 Ohio App.
487, 31 Ohio C. A. 305 (1919).
11 56 Ohio Laws 235 (1859). Omo GEN. CODE ANN. § 11104 (1930):
a receiver may be appointed who shall take charge of all the assets of
such debtor or debtors, including the property so sold, conveyed, transferred,
mortgaged, or assigned, and also administer all the assets of the debtor or
debtors for the equal benefit of the creditors of the debtor or debtors in
proportion to the amount of their respective demands, including those which
are unmatured." (Emphasis supplied.) Shorten v. Woodrow, 34 Ohio St.
645, 653 (1878): "It was not the object of this provision of the statute to
enlarge the class of transfers or conveyances, which Section 2 of the Statute
of Frauds [section 8618] declares 'shall be deemed utterly void and of no
effect.' Its purpose was to supply a new remedy to creditors, by author-
izing the fraudulent conveyance or transfer to be converted into an assign-
ment at the suit of a creditor, and the fund to be distributed, if the creditors
so elect, in the same manner as if the debtor had formally assigned the
property conveyed for the equal benefit of all his creditors." Although
sections 11104-11106 are directly concerned in this investigation, it is section
8618 which is ultimately involved. See Carruthers v. Kennedy, 121 Ohio
St. 8, 166 N.E. 801 (1929); Loudenback v. Foster, 39 Ohio St. 203 (1883).
10 "There are few legal subjects where there is a greater lack of exact
definition and clear understanding of boundaries ....
"The confusions and uncertainties of the existing law which have been
referred to are due primarily to three things: First, the absence of any
well recognized, definite conception of insolvency. Second, failure to make
clear the persons legally injured by a given fraudulent conveyance. Third,
the attempt to make the Statute of Elizabeth cover all conveyances which
wrong creditors, even though the actual intent to defraud does not exist."
9 UNIFORm LAWS ANN., PREFATORY NOTE 325, 326 (1942). 1 GLENN, FRAUDU-
LENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 93 (1940). Twenty states have adopted
the Act, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 109 (Supp. 1947). Its essential features are
contained in section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § 107 d (1946);
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 67.29 (14th ed. 1942).
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should revolutionize the law. In the main it was to be a restate-
ment of its English predecessor and to be declaratory of existing
law." "The great benefit from the enactment of the Statute," the
Commissioners wrote, "will be to remove some confusion of legal
thought, which now renders the law on many points uncertain in
all jurisdictions, and substitute for these uncertain rules both cer-
tain and uniform ones." 12
A discussion of these objectives of the Uniform Act as applied
to Ohio Law is the purpose of this paper.13 The method pursued will
be to consider various problems of fraudulent conveyances, their
general manner of solution, rules applicable under Ohio statutory
and case law, and the proposals of the Uniform Act. For reference
purposes the sectional order of the Uniform Act will be followed.
By this means Ohio law can be compared to general doctrine, and
the possible worth of any changes offered by the Uniform Act can
be appraised.
A MATTER OF DEFINITIONS
Assets
The statute of 13 Elizabeth was originally designed as a revenue
measure to recover for the benefit of the English Crown one-half
the value of property fraudulently conveyed by debtors. The re-
mainder went to aggrieved creditors."' The statute referred to
"lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods and chattels," that is, to
1 Dorrington v. Jacobs, 213 Wis. 521, 252 N.W. 307 (1934); West-
minister Savings Bank v. Sauble, 183 Md. 628, 632, 39 A. 2d 862 (1944);
General Kontrolar Co. v. Allen, 124 F. 2d 123 (C.C.A. 6th 1942); In re Max-
well Sheraton, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), af'd, 137 F. 2d 163
(C.C.A. 2d 1943).
12 "The Uniform Law, however, is by no means comprehensive. Cer-
tain disputes it closes, and closes well. Others it does not mention. But its
saving clause . . .leaves of force, as to any situation not specifically cov-
ered, 'the rules of law and equity,' etc. It follows that each State which
adopts the Uniform Law leaves in effect such principles as her courts have
established save as the Act may plainly cut across the line. Consequently
one must deal with a mixture of statute and case law, even in a State where
the Uniform Law prevails. So far as express provisions go, not only is the
Uniform Law an excellent model, but it furnishes good heads of discussion."
9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN., PREFATORY NOTE 325, 326 (1942). GLENN, Op. cit.
supra note 10, at 101.
1' On December 12, 1947 the Committee on Uniform State Laws of
the Ohio Bar Association, approved the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act for adoption by the Ohio Legislature. This research was undertaken
at the instance of the Committee's former chairman, Mr. James M. Hengst,
and was continued with the approval of its present chairman, Mr. Howard
Dresbach. Its intent is to be objective as distinguished from partisan.
14 ".. . the one moiety whereof to be to the Queen's majesty, her heirs
and succcessors, and the other moiety to the parties grieved." STAT. 13 ELIZ.,
e. 5, § 3 (1571). See interesting historical discussion: 1 GLENN, op cit. supra
note 1. Similar language is contained in STAT. 27 ELiz., c. 4, § 3 (1585).
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creditor assets within the meaning of existing law. Money, bonds
and choses in action were not originally included. Subsequently
with the shift of emphasis in business property from lands and chat-
tels to intangibles, the scope of assets was broadened.1 5
Ohio General Code Section 8618 preserves the older order of
enumeration used in its English predecessor by referring to "lands,
tenements, hereditaments, rents, goods, or chattels." Section 11104,
however, is drafted in terms of a preferential or fraudulent "sale,
conveyance, transfer, mortgage or assignment made or judgment
procured"; and provides that the receiver appointed thereunder
shall "take charge of all the assets of such debtor or debtors, includ-
ing the property so sold, [or] conveyed."
Contrasted with this phrasing, the Uniform Act defines assets
in terms of a debtor's nonexempt property.16 This device avoids the
limitation of a specific enumeration, but necessitates a reference to
state exemption laws. A creditor's right to his debtor's assets is
cast in terms of alienability of property, with especial emphasis upon
availability through judicial proceedings. 17
Both of the Ohio statutes as well as the Uniform Act seem to
proscribe fraudulent transfers of equitable interests in land.18
Choses in action should come within the provisions of Section 11104,
subject to defenses contained in Section 11105. They are not within
the precise terms of Section 8618, and such wording elsewhere has
caused difficulty. 19 But a liberal interpretation of the words "goods
and chattels," used in their generic sense, or the subjection in fact
of choses to legal process because of statutes or otherwise, has.
usually prevailed. 0
1" 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 135; MAY, op. cit. supra note 4 at
17-18; 1 MOORE, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 20 (1908); 87 Am. St. Rep. 488
(1901); 1 & 2 Vic., c. 110, XII (1838).
16 Section 1: "In this act 'assets' of a debtor means property not
exempt from liability for his debts. To the extent that any property is
liable for any debts of the debtor, such property shall be included in his
assets." 9 UNIFoRm LAws ANN. 327 (1942). BAKRa. ACT § 67d (1), 11 U. S.
C. § 107d(1) (1946); Carter v. Carter, 55 Cal. App. 2d 13, 130 P. 2d 186
(1942); Simunek v. Millay, 46 S. D. 620, 195 N. W. 507 (1923); People's State
Bank v. Karlen, 44 S. D. 82, 182 N. W. 531 (1921). Re "good will" see Mait-
land v. Slutsky, 281 Mich. 669, 275 N. W. 726 (1937); Snyder Mfg. Co. v.
Snyder, 54 Ohio St. 86, 43 N. E. 325 (1896); 1 GLENN, op. cit. Mupra note 1,
§ 144. Re powers of appointment RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § § 328, 329
(1940).
'7 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 1, § § 138, 139.
is Brown v. Cutler, 8 Ohio 142 (1837). See Coggshall v. Marine Bank,
63 Ohio St. 88, 57 N. E. 1086 (1900). 1 GLENN, op cit. supra note 1, § 152.
19 MAY, op. cit supra note 4, at 18; BUMP, op cit. supra note 3, § 216.
20 Hall & Farley v. Alabama Terminal & Imp. Co., supra note 5; Bryans
v. Taylor, Wright 245 (Ohio 1833); Newark v. Funk & Bro., 15 Ohio St. 462
(1864).
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Should the Ohio legislature replace Section 8618 with the Uni-
form Act, the change in defining assets would have the beneficial
effect of conforming language to practice. Since Ohio exemption
statutes already apply,21 this feature of the definition would not be
new.
Conveyances
Section 3 of the Statute of Elizabeth penalizes in classic terms
"all and every the parties to such feigned, covinous or fraudulent
feoffment, gift, grant, alienation, bargain, conveyance, bonds, suits,
judgments, executions -and other things before expressed." The
wording of the Ohio statutes is equally specific. Section 8618 reads:
"Every gift, grant or conveyance.., and every bond, judgment or
execution." Section 11104 includes: "A sale, conveyance, transfer,
mortgage or assignment made, or judgment procured by him or
them to be rendered, in any manner, with intent to .hinder, delay
or defraud creditors." The Uniform Act is no less explicit: "Every
payment of money, assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage or
pledge of tangible or intangible property, and also the creation of
any lien or incumbrance." 22
Among these phrasings there is little to choose, but a difficulty
remains. Section 11104 is part of our code provisions regarding
assignments for benefit of creditors. 23 Hence a general assignment
21 OHIo GEN. CODE § § 11721, 11725, 11737 (1938); Tracy v. Cover, 28
Ohio St. 61 (1875). Cf. Gledhill v. Walker, 143 Ohio St. 381, 55 N.E. 2d 647
(1944) (transfers of unclaimed homesteads). See 1 GLENN, Op. cit. supra
note 1, § 171 n. As to insurance OHIo GEN. CODE § § 9394, 9395, 9397, 9398,
11722 (1938) (beneficiary funds); Lytle v. Baldinger, 86 Ohio St. 1, 95 N. E.
389 (1911). Cf. 19 OHio JuR. 734 (1931); In re Weick, 2 F. 2d 647 (1924); 9 U.
OF Cn. L. REV. 498 (1935).
22 An encumbrance has been treated as a "conveyance." Service Mort-
gage Corp. v. Welson, 293 Mass. 410, 200 N. E. 278 (1936). Likewise a con-
signment of goods. Best Made Clothing Co. v. O'Brien, 262 N. Y. Supp. 56,
145 Misc. 787 (N. Y. City 1932). So, also, taking title in donne's name.
Sweney v. Carroll, 118 N. J. Eq. 208, 178 Atl. 539 (Ch. 1935); Haggerty v.
Wilmington Trust Co., 194 Atl. 134 (Del. Ch. 1934). Cf. Dorrington v. Jacobs,
213 Wis. 521, 252 N. W. 307 (1934); and where proceeds (money or equiva-
lent) from mortgage loan were paid to debtor's wife, Leifer v. Murphy, 267
N. Y. Supp. 701, 149 Misc. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1933); the creation of a joint bank
account, Carter v. Carter, supra note 16. As to renunciation of a devise see
27 VA. L. REV. 936-947 (1941).
23Intent to defraud must be shown. Detroit, T. & I. R. R. v. Wright,
48 Ohio App. 305, 193 N. E. 630 (1933). Cf. Loudenback.v. Foster, 39 Ohio
St. 203 (1883); Barber v. Colt, 144 Fed. 381 (1906). It was once held that a
gratuitous conveyance from a husband to his wife, being void in law and
in equity for lack of capacity, was not within this statute so as to inure to
the benefit of creditors generally. Fowler v. Trebein, 16 Ohio St. 493 (1866).
Re taking title in another's name see Bloomingdale v. Stein, 42 Ohio St. 168,
171 (1884); Beebe v. Canda, 18 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 104 (1911). Cf. Mason v.
Eichels, 8 Ohio Dec. Rep. 436 (1882); BumP, op. cit. supra note 3, § § 217, 218;
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is not necessarily a fraudulent conveyance. 24 Further, under an
earlier form of Section 8618 a general assignment was held not to
be fraudulent per se.25 On the other hand Section 4 of the Uniform
Act provides that a conveyance by an insolvent is fraudulent regard-
less of intent, if it is made "without a fair consideration" -26-- a de-
scription which clearly fits a general assignment. Also, while
except in Massachusetts 27 the distinction between general assign-
ments and fraudulent conveyances is firmly rooted, it has been well
said that "originally the general assignment only escaped being
treated as a fraudulent conveyance by main strength." 28 Conse-
quently the enactment of Section 4 as worded might have a dis-
turbing effect upon the validity of assignments for benefit of
creditors.
Because of the doubt created by the phrasing of Section 4,25 it
has been suggested 3 o that the definition of a conveyance in the Act
should be supplemented by the words: "except when given to a
trustee for the benefit of all unsecured creditors." This qualification
was added by the Washington legislature when it adopted the Act
in 1945. 31
Creditors
By combining the words "creditors and others" the statute of 13
Elizabeth extended its benefits beyond persons who could strictly
be classed as creditors. Both this statute and its American counter-
parts have been liberally construed to include "all persons who have
a valid cause of action." 32 It is immaterial whether the demand
1 GLENN, OP. cit. supra note 1, § 210; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 440 (1935). See
O'Hara v. Bell, 8 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 352, 20 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 55 (1909).24 Even though the assignor intends to defraud. Floyd & Co. v. Smith,
9 Ohio St. 546 (1859); Thomas v. Talmadge, 16 Ohio St. 433 (1866).25 Bancroft & Caffee v. Blizzard, 13 Ohio 30 (1844); Hoffman Burnes-
ton & Co. v. Mackall, 5 Ohio St. 124 (1855); Conkling & Shepherd v. Coon-
rod & Crum, 6 Ohio St. 611 (1856).
- See page 597 infra for text of the Act. The definition of a "fair
eration" in Section 3 of the Act is set out infra page 592.27 Hall, Voluntary Assignments and Insolvency in Massachusetts, 8
HARV. L. REV. 265 (1894); GLENN, LIQUIDATION §§ 105-108 (1935).
- GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 208 (1940).
29 Under Section 3a(1) and (4) of the Bankruptcy Act, fraudulent con-
veyances and general assignments are treated separately as acts of bank-
ruptcy. Under the Act of 1867, a general assignment was not listed as an
act of bankruptcy, but by construction it was considered to be a fraud upon
the Act. Platt v. Preston, 19 Fed. Cas. 847, No. 11,219 (S.D.N.Y. 1876);
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 3. 401 (14th ed. 1940).3OBridgman, Uniform, Fraudulent Conveyance Act in Minnesota, 7
MINN. L. REV. 530, 532 (1923).
3
. WASH. REV. STAT. AxNN. § 5854-40 (Supp. 1945).
32 1 MOORE, op. cit. swpra note 15, at 198; BumP, op. cit. supra note 3,
§§ 502, 503. Protection for purchasers of land was furnished in STAT. 27
ELIz., c. 4 (1585).
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sounds in damages for fort or arises out of breach of contract,3
provided the action is enforceable by legal process.34 Thus an as-
signee of a creditor 35 may sue, and in proper instances the right is
extended to a debtor's personal representative.
The Ohio statutes are content to use the word, "creditors", 3 but
a similarly liberal construction has been employed.3 8 Creditors and
subsequent purchasers may attach a conveyance; 39 but a stranger
may not; 40 nor may a creditor who holds ample security; 41 nor one
against whom the statute of limitations had run when the convey-
ance was made.42 The right of a debtor's assignee for creditors and
33 "Every person having a legal demand against another, is his creditor,
whether that demand is one sounding in damages, or one that comes under
a contract." Harris v. Harris's Ex'r, 23 Gratt. 737, 764 (Va. 1873). See
American Surety Co. v. Marotta, 287 U.S. 513 (1933) (surety). Pierce v.
United States, 255 U.S. 398 (1921) (liability to a fine). Cf. State v. Malecky,
202 Iowa 307, 210 N.W. 121 (1926). For a discussion of this case see 12
IOWA L. REv. 196 (1926); 16 CALIF. L. REV. 254 (1916); 33 HARV. L. REv. 866
(1920); 18 VA. L. REV. 203 (1931). In some states a tort claimant is classed
as a subsequent creditor. 1 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 200-202; 14 Am.
St. Rep. 745 (1890). Cf. 1 GLENN, Op. cit. supra note 28, at 339, 340.
34
BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 152-157.
35 Anderson v. Maltby, 2 Ves. 244, 255 (1739); Martin v. Pewtress, 4
Burr. 2478 (1769); In re Downing, 201 Fed. 93 (1912); Moore v. U. S. One
Stave Barrel Co., 238 Ill. 544, 87 N. E. 536 (1909); Blake v. Griswold, 104
N. Y. 613, 11 N. E. 137 (1887). A sheriff on execution process, Gale v. Wil-
liamson, 8 M. & W. 405 (1841); Scarfe v. Hallifax, 7 M. & W. 288 (1840).
1 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 205-207.
36 1 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 208, 765. See Hurwitz v. Hurwitz,
136 F. 2d 726 (1943); 45 YALE L. J. 510 (1936); 57 HARv. L. REV. 253 (1943).
Cf. MAY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 525; 1 GLENN, op; cit. supra note 28, § 104n.
37 OHIo GEN. CODE §§ 8618, 11104, 11106 (1938).
38 "He is a creditor who has a right by law to demand and recover of
another a sum of money on any account whatever." Ilkovis v. Conrad, 16
Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 389 (1905); Western Bank & Trust v. Mitchell, 44 Ohio
App. 552, 186 N. E. 517 (1932) (holder of notes for money loaned); Boies v.
Johnson, 1 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 451 (1903) (surety on bond); Stivens v. Sum-
mers, 68 Ohio St. 421, 67 N. E. 884 (1903) (surety on bond); McVeigh v.
Ritenour, 40 Ohio St. 107 (1883) (breach of promise to marry); Rose v.
Rose, 34 Ohio App. 89, 169 N. E. 827 (1929) (conveyance of personalty to
avoid possible alimony decree).
39 Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio 469 (1824). For conditions governing
attachment by subsequent creditors see notei 220-223 infra.
4°Wright v. Snell, 22 Ohio C. C. 86, 93, 12 Ohio C. D. 308 (1901); Jay
v. Squire, 7 Ohio N. P. 345, 5 Ohio Dec. 318 (1896). See Brice v. Myers, 5
Ohio 121 (1831).
41 Stephenson v. Donahue, 40 Ohio St. 184 (1883); City Trust & Savings
Bank v. Weaver, 68 Ohio App. 323, 22 Ohio Op. 529 (1941); MAY, op. cit.
suipra note 4, at 163, 164; BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 188.
4.Jones v. Lehman, 15 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 541 (1905). Re statute of
limitations as defense to the debt see 1 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 196.
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of his personal representative is expressly provided. 3
The Uniform Act defines a creditor as "a person having a claim,
whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, abso-
lute, fixed or contingent." This is a definition of creditors as dis-
tinguished from a determination of whether or not a claim must be
matured, be reduced to judgment, or must create a lien before
relief will be granted-problems to be discussed subsequently. It
is not controlling that a claim is secured. 4 Actions for fraud or
deceit,4 for malicious prosecution,41 or for injury in an automobile
accident 11 are included, as are those for breach of promise to
marry.48 Such claims date from the commission of the wrongful
act rather than from the entry of judgment.49 So, also, a surety is a
43 OHIO GEN. CODE § 11106 (1938) (assignees for creditors). Ohio Gen-
eral Code Sections 10510-49, 50 (personal representatives) is limited to
sales of real estate fraudulently conveyed by an insolvent, if needed to pay
debts of the estate. McCall v. Pixley, 48 Ohio St. 379, 27 N. E. 887 (1891);
Hoffman v. Kiefer, 19 Ohio C. C. 401, 10 Ohio C. D. 304 (1899). But not if
the rights of a bona fide purchaser intervene. Doney v. Clark, 55 Ohio St.
294, 45 N. E. 316 (1896). If not needed to pay debts of the estate see Ben-
jamin v. LeBaron, 15 Ohio 517 (1846); Lockwood v. Krum, 34 Ohio St. 1,
10 (1877); Kihlken v. Kihlken, 59 Ohio St. 106, 51 N. E. 969 (1898); Baker
v. Hall, 9 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 396, 20 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 445 (1910). Re trus-
tee in bankruptcy. BANKR. ACT § 70e, 11 U. S. C. § 110e (1946).
44 And so includes a secured creditor. Marshall & Ilsley Bank v.
Stepke, 228 Wis. 39, 279 N. W. 625 (1938; [1939] Wis. L. REV. 102.4 5 Myer, Conner & Co. v. United Founders' Corp., 265 N.Y. Supp. 289,
238 App. Div. 642 (1st Dep't 1933).
4 Oliphant v. Moore, 155 Tenn. 359, 293 S. W. 541 (1927).
47 Iden v. Huber, 259 Mich. 3, 242 N. W. 818 (1932); Leifer v. Murphy,
267 N. Y. Supp. 701, 149 Misc. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (judgment creditor);
Richards v. Jones, 16 Del. Ch. 227, 142 Atl. 832 (1928). See 1 GLENN, op. cit.
supra note 28, § 81.
48 Scarborough v. Pickens, 26 Tenn. App. 213, 170 S. W. 2d 585 (1943);
Oliphant v. Moore, 155 Tenn. 359, 293 S. W. 541 (1927); Marcus v. Kane, 18
F. 2d 722 (C. C. A. 2d 1927); Dutcher v. Van Duine, 242 Mich. 477, 219 N. W.
651 (1928). See Beam v. Bennett, 51 Mich. 148, 16 N. W. 316 (1883) (judg-
ment creditor); Hoffman v. Junk, 51 Wis. 613, 8 N. W. 493 (1881) (judg-
ment creditors).
'- Chorpenning v. Yellow Cab Co., 113 N. J. Eq. 389, 167 Atl. 12 (Ch.
1933), aff'd, 115 N. J. Eq. 170 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934); Lange v. Semanske,
108 N. J. Eq. 538, 155 Atl. 783 (Ch. 1931) (wrongful death). Ohio holds in
wrongful death action that the widow is a subsequent creditor. Edwards v.
Monning, 63 Ohio App. 449, 27 N. E. 2d 156 (1939), afi'd, 137 Ohio St. 268,
270, 28 N. E. 2d 627 (1940), "If Ohio were among the states that had
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, this contention of the
defendants would require no discussion, inasmuch as the express provisions
thereof authorize a future creditor to set aside a transfer under such cir-
cumstances. Furthermore, in the act a creditor is defined as a 'person hav-
ing any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated,
absolute, fixed or contingent.' However, as indicated by this court in the
cases of Evans v. Lewis, supra [30 Ohio St. 11 (1876)] and Pfisterer v.
Toledo, Bowling Green & Southern Traction Co., 89 Ohio St. 172, 106 N. E.
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creditor,"' or an employee who holds an unliquidated claim for
breach of a contract for personal services,', or a mortgagee. 2 But it
has been held that a wife seeking alimony has not a creditor's right
to attack her husband's purchase of an annuity contract;53 nor is an
undertaker a creditor of the person whom he buries, regardless of
his relation to the decedent's estate.5 4
In the main, then, the definition of a creditor contained in the
Uniform Act restates the liberal meaning of the term, as used in
statutes on fraudulent conveyance in Ohio and elsewhere. The im-
portant differences under the Act, as will be seen later, lie in the
field of enforcement.
Debts
Since the words, "debt" or "debtor", assume a debtor-creditor
relation, cases that define a "creditor" are in point also in determin-
ing the meaning of a "debt" or "debtor." The terms are equally
broad. But while every "debt" is an "obligation," the converse is
not necessarily true.5 5
For the purpose of setting aside fraudulent conveyances, it is
ordinarily held that a debtor's obligation at the time of transfer may
be contingent. Thus a surety's obligation is a "debt" prior to his
principal's default,"" as is a potential liability for breach of war-
ranty,5 7T of contract to marry,58 of an unreleased assignor on a lease
18 [1913], this has not been held the rule in this state. 39 A.L.R., 179."
Edwards v. Monning, supra at 270-271, 28 N. E. 2d 627, 628. In the Evans
and Pfisterer cases tort claimants were required to show intent to defraud
subsequent creditors. See 6 Outo ST. L. J. 319 (1940).
5oMcDonald v. Baldwin, 24 Tenn. App. 670, 148 S. W. 2d 385 (1941).
See Stump v. Rogers, 1 Ohio 533 (1824); Omo GEN. CoDE § 12206 (1938);
1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 93d.
53 Pallott v. LaSalle Roofing & Shingle Co., 254 N. Y. Supp. 748, 142
Misc. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
52Dondis v. Lash, 277 Mass. 477, 178 N. E. 624 (1931); Marshall &
flsley Bank v. Stepke, supra note 44. Cf. Stephenson v. Donahue, supra
note 41.
53Maruska v. Equitable Life Ins. Assur. Soc., 21 F. Supp. 841 (D.
Minn. 1938) (interpreting Minnesota law). Generally it is different as to
conveyances of realty. Renn v. Renn, 207 Ark. 147, 179 S. W. 2d 657 (1944);
Chittenden v. Chittenden, 22 Ohio C. C. 498, 12 Ohio C. D. 526 (1901);
1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 337. Cf. Rose v. Rose, supra note 38.
54 In re Vitelli's Estate, 261 N. Y. Supp. 266, 146 Misc. 17 (Surr. Ct.
1932) (to contest a gift causa mortis); In re Reich's Estate, 262 N. Y. Supp.
623, 146 Misc. 616 (Surr. Ct. 1933) (to contest a trust).
55 Pennsylvania Co. v. Scott, 346 Pa. 13, 29 A. 2d 328 (1942).
r6 Bussell v. Glenn, 197 Ga. 816, 30 S. E. 2d 617 (1944); Barrett & Co.
v. Still, 102 S. C. 19, 86 S. E. 204 (1915); Ochoa v. Edwards, 189 S. W. 1022
(Tex. 1916). Cf. Severs v. Dodson, 53 N. J. Eq. 633, 34 Atl. 7 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1895). See 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, §§ 332, 93d.
57 Cowan v. Staggs, 178 Ala. 144, 59 So. 153 (1912).
5S Louk v. Patten, 58 Idaho 334, 73 P. 2d 949 (1937).
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for rent, 9 or the liability of one who assumes a mortgage obliga-
tion. 0 Some courts include the contingent liability of a bank stock-
holder."' Since obligation under a contract arises at date of agree-
ment,62 it is not essential to prove that a claim upon contract is
enforceable. 8 But in any event an indebtedness must be existing
or in contemplation."
Ohio General Code Section 11104 uses the words "debtor or
debtors," but does not define the terms. The words "debt" or
"debtor" do not appear in Section 8618, but the problem of inter-
pretation is the same under either statute. The liberal construction
noted above has included persons who are contingently liable upon
a note,6" or upon a certificate of bank stock,6  as well as a surety
upon an appeal bond.' But consistently with their stand on tort
claimants as creditors our courts class an unliquidated liability for
personal injuries as a subsequent as distinguished from a present
debt.6 8
The Uniform Act provides that a "'Debt' includes any legal
liability, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated, absolute, fixed
or contingent." The similarity of phrasing in the definition of a
"creditor" is apparent, and the liberality of construction follows of
course. Hence a continuing surety upon a depository bond is a
59 Sallaske v. Fletcher, 73 Wash. 593, 132 Pac. 648 (1913).
60 Wallace v. Brooks, 194 Okla. 137, 147 P. 2d. 784 (1944); Nelson v.
Wilson, 81 Mont. 560, 264 Pac. 697 (1928).
61 Peterson v. Wahlquist, 125 Neb. 247, 249 N. W. 678 (1933); Squire
v. Cramer, 64 Ohio App. 169, 28 N. E. 2d 516 (1940). Cf. Chamberlin v.
Wagar, 272 Mich. 594, 262 N. W. 417 (1935); Irwin v. Schleichert, 327 InI.
App. 512, 64 N. E. 2d 566 (1946); Rogers v. Marchant, 91 F. 2d 660 (C. C. A.
4th 1937); 34 COL. L. REV. 373 (1934); 19 IOWA L. REv. 121 (1933); 1 GLENN,
op. cit. supra note 28, § 332 n. 79.
62 Kennard v. Curran, 239 Ill. 122, 87 N. E. 913 (1909). See Brice v.
Myers, 5 Ohio 121 (1831).
63 Arizona State Bank v. Crystal Ice & Cold Storage Co., 26 Ariz. 82,
222 Pac. 407 (1924), modified on rehearing, 26 Ariz. 205, 224 Pac. 622 (1924).
A creditor's judgment on the debt is conclusive as to the existence of the
debt in the absence of collusion of the parties. Candee v. Lord, 2 N. Y. 269
(1849).
(4 Mills v. Susanka, 394 Ill. 439, 68 N. E. 2d 904 (1946).
65 Jones v. Leeds, 7 Ohio N. P. 480, 10 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 173 (1900).
66 Squire v. Cramer, 64 Ohio App. 169, 28 N. E. 2d 516 (1940).
67 Kerber v. Ruff, 3 Ohio N. P. 165, 4 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 406 (1896).
Os Kushmeder v. Overton, 26 Ohio App. 74, 159 N. E. 351 (1926); Schu-
beler v. Lilly, 23 Ohio App. 481, 155 N. E. 699 (1926); Friedel v. Wolfle, 41
Ohio App. 564, 180 N. E. 738 (1931); Pfisterer v. Traction Co., 89 Ohio St.
172, 106 N. E. 18 (1913); Evans v. Lewis, 30 Ohio St. 11 (1876). See note
,49 supra. But he is protected by the attachment statute sections of the
code. OHio GEN. CODE §§ 10290, 11819 (1933). 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note
28, § 81.
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debtor,8 9 and the breach of a contract for personal services consti-
tutes a debt,7 0 as does the contingent liability of an indorser.7 1
Further, the definition includes an unliquidated ex delicto claim 
7 2
and the liability of a director of a trust company for negligent con-
duct in approving loans." It has also been applied to one who
received public financial assistance.7 4
As in the definition of a creditor, any substantial change in the
definition of a debt that would follow the adoption of the Act would
result in a field of remedies.
INSOLVENCY
The term "insolvency" as applied to fraudulent conveyances is
ambiguous. It may mean insufficiency of assets over liabilities,75
but this definition 7 6 leaves in doubt what assets are to be consid-
ered, and the basis as well as the time for their valuation.77 Under
it one is not necessarily insolvent because his current liquid assets
are insufficient to meet his current liabilities,78 or to meet them
without borrowing money.79
In a commercial sense, however, one may be insolvent even
6D State ex rel. v. Nashville Trust Co., 28 Tenn. App. 388, 190 S. W. 2d
785 (1944).
70 Pallott v. LaSalle Roofing Co., 254 N. Y. Supp. 748, 142 Misc. 462
(Sup. Ct. 1931).
71 Shay v. Gagne, 275 Mass. 386, 176 N. E. 200 (1931).
72 Leifer v. Murphy, 267 N. Y. Supp. 701, 149 Misc. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1933);
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P. 2d 513 (1935).
73 Comm'r of Banks v. Walker, 299 Mass. 123, 12 N. E. 2d 103 (1937).
74 Dep't of Public Assistance v. Wanta, 36 Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep. 61 (Pa.
C. P. 1941).
75 Gipson v. Bedard, 173 Minn. 104, 217 N. W. 139 (1927); Schroeder v.
State, 210 Wis. 366, 244 N. W. 599 (1932).
7 6 The test of liabilities over assets is used in certain sections of the
Bankruptcy Act, §§ 1 (19), 67d (1) (d) (re fraudulent conveyances). It was
otherwise under the Act of 1867. "Insolvency in the sense of the Bank-
ruptcy Act means that the party whose business affairs are in question is
unable to pay his debts as they become due in the ordinary course of his
daily transactions." Buchanan v. Smith, 16 Wall. 277, 308 (U. S. 1872).
"Counsel makes the common mistake of failing to distinguish between the
meaning of the term 'insolvent', as the subject of insolvency is dealt with
by insolvent and bankruptcy laws, and the general meaning thereof. The
former is inability of a person to pay his debts as they mature in the
ordinary course of business; the latter is a substantial excess of a person's
liabilities over the fair cash value of his property." Marvin v. Anderson,
111 Wis. 387, 390, 87 N. W. 226, 227 (1901). See BANRR. ACT §§ 3a (5), 75c,
77a, 83a, 130, 323, 423, 623; 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 67.32 (14th ed. 1942).
77 1 MooR2, op. cit. swpra note 15, at 275.
78 Smith v. Collins, 94 Ala. 394, 10 So. 334 (1891). See Wooters v.
Osborn, 77 Ind. 513 (1881).
79 See Silver Valley Min. Co. v. N. C. Smelting Co., 119 N. C. 417, 25
S. E. 954 (1896).
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though his assets,80 if liquid, would satisfy his debts." This would
result if his assets were concealed, -8 2 or if he could not meet his
debts as they ordinarily mature.82 And it would seem that for some
purposes an unfavorable balance of liabilities over assets is not
controlling, if there is reasonable prospect of payment in due
course of business."
These differences in definition are illustrated by two Ohio
statutes. Ohio General Code Section 13108-1, relating to stock
brokers, adopts the so-called bankruptcy test for insolvency, and
provides that "a person shall be deemed insolvent within the mean-
ing of this act whenever the aggregate of his property shall not, at
a fair valuation, be sufficient in amount to pay his debts." 85 On the
other hand for purposes of the Sales Act, 8 "A person is insolvent
. . who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course
of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due, whether
he has committed an act of bankruptcy, or not, and whether he is
insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law or not."
The two main Ohio code sections under discussion do not men-
tion insolvency in connection with a fraudulent conveyance. Sec-
tion 11104, however, refers to transfers made "in contemplation of
insolvency and with a design to prefer one or more creditors."
(Emphasis supplied.) "Contemplation of insolvency" includes either
a present or a future condition, and "insolvency" is clearly used in
the commercial sense.8 7
80 
"Land which may be exempted should be included in the estimate,
unless there is evidence of an intention on the part of the donor to claim
the exemption." Corliss v. Jewett, 36 Minn. 364 (1887). BumP, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 295. Cf. Underleak v. Scott, 117 Minn. 136, 134 N. W. 731
(1912).
81 Levan's Appeal, 112 Pa. 294, 300 (1886); 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra note
15, § 8. Cf. BumP, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 255, 256, 257. "Most of the cases
make no attempt to define insolvency and because of this it is impossible
to determine to what extent they are in conflict, if at all." BnLLIG AND
CAREY, CASES ON ADMINISTRATION OF INSOLVENT ESTATES, 142 n. (1932).
1-2Blake v. Sawin, 10 Allen 340 (Mass. 1865).
83Moore v. Carr, 65 Mo. App. 64 (1895).
S4Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 Atl. 45 (1933).
85 See Eastman v. State, 131 Ohio St. 1, 1 N. E. 2d 140 (1936).
80 OHIo GEN. CODE § 8456-3 (1938). See American Hosiery Co. v. Baker,
18 Ohio C. C. 604, 10 Ohio C. D. 219 (1899) (rescission for fraud).
S7 "The law in other respects has been changed, but the phrase, 'in
contemplation of insolvency,' has endured; and it means now, as it meani
then, that one was in contemplation of insolvency when he realized thai
either at the time or in the early future his deranged financial conditior
was or would be such that he would be unable to pay his debts as the
became due." Prose v. Beardsley, 18 Ohio App. 211, 218 (1924). Mitchell
v. Gazzam, 12 Ohio 315 (1843); overruled on another point, Cross v. Cars-
tens, 49 Ohio St. 548, 31 N. E. 506 (1892). "Counsel have labored [to define]
the meaning of the term insolvency. In the mercantile sense, it means
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But the solution does not end here. The history of Section
11104 shows that in the law of insolvent estates preferences and
fraudulent transfers were originally treated in separate sections.
"Contemplation of insolvency" appeared only in the section on pref-
erences. This difference in phrasing was preserved when the two
sections were combined. 8 Because of this background, it is not clear
that the commercial definition of insolvency, which is judicially ap-
plied to preferences in Section 11104, should be extended to fraudu-
lent conveyances under that section, or to actions under Section
8618.89 As to voluntary conveyances under the latter section, it has
been said that the property conveyed by a debtor must clearly be
sufficient to pay all of his debts.90
person unable to pay his debts according to the ordinary usages of trade.
But in the broad sense used by the statute, it means a person whose affairs
have become so deranged that he is unable to pay his debts as they fall
due.. . ." Mitchell v. Gazzam, supra, at 336. As to "contemplation of insol-
vency," the court in Harris v. Pattison Supply Co., 17 Ohio L. Abs. 555
(1934), said, "The statute invalidates an assignment made in contemplation
of insolvency, with a design to prefer one creditor to the exclusion of
another.... Such contemplation must be more than a mere apprehension.
It must amount to a definitely recognized probability accompanied by pro-
vision against such contingency in favor of the creditor preferred." See
Churchill v. Russell, 18 Ohio C. C. 832, 838, 9 Ohio C. D. 145 (1899).8 8History. Preferences: 33 Ohio Laws 13, § 1 (1835); 36 Ohio Laws
56, 57, § 3 (1838); 51 Ohio Laws 163, 463 (1853); Rnv. STAT. c. 54, § 1, c. 57,
§ 3, c. 194, § 3, c. 1290, § 1 (Curwen 1853). Preferences and fraudulent con-
veyances: 56 Ohio Laws 235, §§ 16, 17 (1859); 60 Ohio Laws 8, § 17 (1863);
75 Ohio Laws 938, §§ 9, 10 (1878); REv. STAT. §§ 6343, 6344 (1880); 93 Ohio
LAws 290 (1898); 95 Ohio Laws 608 (1902); 99 Ohio Laws 241 (1908); REV.
STAT. c. 2040, §§ 16, 17 (Curwen 1861). Curruthers v. Kennedy, 121 Ohio St.
8, 166 N. E. 801 (1929). "A sale, conveyance... made in trust or otherwise,
by a debtor ... in contemplation of insolvency and with a design to prefer
one or more creditors . .. , and a sale, conveyance. . . made ... with intent
to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, shall be void as to creditors of such
debtor...." rio GEN. CODE § 11104 (1938).80 Cf. "It will be readily observed that the phrase relating to insolvency
in section 11104 long antedates the definition of solvency made by the
bankruptcy act, as the term appeared in the legislation of this state at least
eighty years ago. The definition of the term in the bankruptcy act, there-
fore, has no application to the Ohio statute." Prose v. Beardsley, supra
note 87, at 217; See Jones v. Leeds, 7 Ohio N. P. 480 (1900) (REv. STAT.
§§ 6343, 6344); Farmer's National Bank of Canfield v. Miller, 9 Ohio C. C.
111 (1894) (REV. STAT. §§ 6343, 6344). This possible distinction seems not
to have been before the court in Cole v. Merchants 'National Bank of
Toledo, 15 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 315, 341, 342 (1907).
90 "And such gift is never upheld, unless property, clearly and beyond
doubt, is retained sufficient to pay all the donor's debts." Crumbaugh v.
Kugler, 2 Ohio St. 373, 378 (1835). "A person claiming under such advance-
ment, must be prepared, however, clearly and conclusively to show that
there was other property sufficient to pay all subsisting debts." Miller v.
Wilson, 15 Ohio 108, 114 (1846); See Gormley v. Potter, 29 Ohio St. 597, 599
(1876); Brice v. Myer, 5 Ohio 121 (1831).
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The Uniform Act provides that "A person is insolvent when the
present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount that
will be required to pay his probable liability on his existing debts as
they become absolute and matured." 11 This is said to be a "com-
mercial definition" of insolvency. 2 There is authority, however,
that "inability to pay current obligations as they mature" does not
establish insolvency under this wording. 3 The word "present" may
not be disregarded 4 and property relied upon for proof of solvency
must be salable at a fair value.9 5 By definition of assets only non-
91 The section continues: "(2) In determining whether a partnership
is insolvent there shall be added to the partnership property the present
fair salable value of the separate assets of each general partner in excess of
the amount probably sufficient to meet the claims of his separate creditors,
and also the amount of any unpaid subscription to the partnership of each
limited partner, provided the present fair salable value of the assets of
such limited partner is probably sufficient to pay his debts, including such
unpaid subscriptions." Accord, BAqxR. AcT 67d(4), 11 U. S. C. 107d(4)
(1946). Cf. BANxa. ACT 67d(l) (d) (Bankruptcy test applied to fraudulent
conveyances). CRAN E, PARTNERsHnip 178 (1938).
92 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 465. See Sokol v. Fidelity Union
Trust Co., 138 N. J. Eq. 429, 48 A. 2d 207 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946); Fidelity
Trust Co. v. Union National Bank of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 467, 169 Atl. 209
(1933).
98 Hofan v. Knauth, 282 N. Y. Supp. 219, 156 Misc. 545 (Mun. Ct. 1935).
Cf. Chase National Bank v. U. S. Trust Co., 236 App. Div. 500, 260 N. Y.
Supp. 40 (1st Dep't 1932).
94 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union National Bank of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 467,
169 Atl. 209 (1933); 4 COLLIER, Op. cit. supra note 10, § 67.32.
95 "The Bankruptcy Act provides for determining a person's insol-
vency by taking his assets 'at a fair valuation'; the ordinary nonstatutory
concept commonly styled 'insolvency in the equity sense' involves a valua-
tion of assets at what might be called a 'present quick salable value'....
This last test-'present fair salable value'-seems to be intermediate be-
tween the other two. Judicial construction of its meaning might be helpful,
but little has yet appeared." McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform
Fradulent Conveyance Act, 46 HARV. L. REV. 404, 420 (1933). 1 GLENN, Op.
cit. supra note 28, § 272. Excess of liabilities over assets should constitute
insolvency under Section 2. Kearney Plumbing Supply Co. v. Gland, 8 N. J.
Misc. 789, 151 Atl. 873 (Ch.1930); People's Savings & Dime Bank & Trust
Co. v. Scott, 303 Pa. 294, 154 Atl. 489 (1931). See 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 275-283.
Ohio seems to have applied the stricter test of "present quick salable
value." "Now, how was it in this case? The property retained by Kugler,
liable to the payment of his debts, amounted to about $48,000. His debts,
at the lowest calculation, amounted to $42,000, and they probably amounted
to $47,000. But taking the amount of indebtedness at the lowest estimate,
$42,000, and experience teaches us that, owing to the expenses incident to
the sale, and the sacrifice almost universally attending forced sales, the
amount of property reserved would not have paid the debts, if subjected to
that purpose." Crumbaugh v. Kugler, 2 Ohio St. 373, 378 (1853). To this
extent, adoption of the test of "present fair salable value" would benefit
debtors. This advantage, however, might be cancelled out by a shifting to
the commercial standard.
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exempt property is included, 6 but no mention is made of property
fraudulently transferred. 7 "Existing debts," of course, include con-
tingent liabilities,' and a return of an execution unsatisfied estab-
lishes the debtor's prima facie insolvency.90 Subsequent insol-
vency 100 does not govern.
Because of the ambiguities latent in the term "insolvency" and
of differences in statutory definition, it would seem advisable-
should the Act be adopted-that its definition of insolvency in Sec-
tion 2 be restricted to purposes of the statute.1 1 As indicated in the
notes,102 it is problematical whether the total effect of the substitu-
tion would materially alter results of the Ohio cases.
OQ Wight v. Rohlffs, 48 Cal. App. 2d 696, 121 P. 2d 76 (1942) (exclud-
ing property located outside of the state and immune from local process);
Carter v. Carter, 55 Cal. App. 2d 13, 130 P. 2d 186 (1942); Adams v. Prather,
176 Cal. 33, 167 Pac. 534 (1917). "Whether the property reserved is what
will be deemed ample does not depend entirely on the amount and value,
as the real end to be accomplished is that the conveyance shall not deprive
creditors of the means of collecting their debts." BuMP, op. cit. suipra note
3, at 298; BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 225.
97 The rule is not clear. "If Scott was solvent when he made the trans-
fer to his wife, aside from the property transferred, it was valid regardless
of consideration." Peoples Savings & Dime Bank & Trust Co. v. Scott, 303
Pa. 294, 297, 154 Atl. 489, 490 (1931). "In the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act, the term 'assets' is defined as being property liable for debts of
the debtor, but this must be held to mean property in his name or property
the title which would be in him if a fraudulent conveyance were set aside."
Dorrington v. Jacobs, 213 Wis. 521, 527, 252 N. W. 307, 309 (1934). "Literally
applied the Uniform Act would compel consideration of property fraudu-
lently transferred by A in determining his insolvency. If included it could
be argued, however, that it would not substantially affect the determination
of A's insolvency, since the 'present fair salable value' of such assets, which
prima facie belongs to someone else, is about nil." 4 CoLLIER, Op. cit. supra
note 10, at § 67.32 n. 9. See Goodrick v. Sheets, 19 Ohio App. 207 (1924);
Bump, op. cit. supra note 3, § 255.
98 UNwom FRAuDULENT CONVEYANcE ACT § 1; Peoples' Savings & Dime
Bank & Trust Co. v. Scott, supra note 97; Chase National Bank v. U. S. Trust
Co., supra note 93. But cf. Ayres v. Harrell, 111 Ga. 864, 36 S. E. 946 (1900)
(liability as an indorser not likely to become absolute); Bump, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 255.
90 Halsey v. Winant, 233 App. Div. 103, 251 N. Y. Supp. 81 (1st Dep't
1931), rev'd on other grounds, 258 N. Y. 512, 180 N. E. 253 (1932); Leifer v.
Murphy, 149 Misc. 455, 267 N. Y. Supp. 701 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
100 Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia v. Godfrey, 120 N. J. Eq. 203,
184 Atl. 525 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936). See Creed v. Lancaster Bank, 1 Ohio St.
1 (1852); Goodrick v. Sheets, supra note 97; National LaFayette Bank v.
Scott, Hosea 481, 13 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 600 (1903).
101 When it adopted the Act in 1924, the Massachusetts legislature in-
serted the words "within the meaning of this chapter" after the word "in-
solvent." MAss. GEN. LAws c. 109A, § 2 (1932).
10 2 See note 5 supra. -
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TRANSFERS FOR VALUE AND IN GOOD FAITH
It is, of course, obvious that the long inveighing by courts and
legislatures against fraudulent conveyances is because of debtor
transactions 03 which are considered to be unfair to creditors. This
unfairness may result directly from a debtor's intention to defeat
claims of his creditors, or indirectly from conditions of a transfer
which transgress accepted business standards and so constitute con-
structive fraud.10 4 Such conditions may be associated with the in-
solvency of the debtor, the inadequacy of price or the dispropor-
tionment of security offered, with excessive generosity or preferen-
tial treatment, or with indirection in the handling of property. It is
a problem, then, of value and of good faith.'0 '
In the absence of an intent actually to defraud, an insolvent
debtor may dispose of his property at its fair market value,' or
mortgage it to secure future advances.10 7 So, also, value to support a
transfer may consist of a previous debt 108 unless the parties treat
the debt as still existing.10 A conveyance made in payment of a past
gratuity, such as a "voluntary courtesy," " 0 or for an executory
promise "I is not upon a valuable consideration. But not all courts
apply this strictness to a debt that is barred by the statute of limi-
tations,11 2 or to one that is unenforceable under the Statute of
103 "Anything out of the usual course of business is a sign of fraud."
BUMP, op. cit. supra note 3, at 51; 1 MooaE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 246, 257.
104 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, §§ 296, 305.
105 "This act ... shall not extend to any (property that) shall be upon
good consideration and bona fides conveyed or assured to any person
not having at the time ... any manner of notice or knowledge of. such...
fraud." STAT. 13 ELiz., c. 5 (1571).
106 Carlson v. Kirchman, 131 Neb. 229, 267 N. W. 452 (1936).
107 Reidy v. Collins, 134 Cal. App. 713, 26 P. 2d 712 (1933).
108 Seymour v. Wilson, 19 N. Y. 417 (1859); Bump, op. cit. supra note 3,
§ 164 n.; 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, §§ 289, 289a; cf. § 375 n.
100 Starr v. Starr, 1 Ohio 321 (1824); 1 MoORE, op. cit. suprw) note 15
at 312. It has been held that one who takes such a conveyance is not ar
innocent purchaser. Taylor v. Taylor, 9 Tenn. App. 70 (1928).
110 E.g., ordinary services within the family. Faloon v. McIntyre, 11i
Ill. 292, 8 N. E. 315 (1886); BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 557 n.
111 E.g., check, payment of which is to be withheld. Arnholt v. Hart-
wig, 73 Mo. 485 (1881). But a negotiable note is sufficient. Weaver v
Nugent, 72 Tex. 272, 10 S. W. 458 (1888); Rogers v. Kinsey, 8 Ohio Dec
Rep. 308 (1882). Future services may suffice. In re Parsons, 150 Mass. 343
23 N. E. 50 (1890); but there is authority contra. Lehman v. Bentley, 11
N. Y. Supp. 778 (N. Y. City 1892). See BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, a
566 n.; 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 296-298.
112May v. Mathers, 233 Ala. 654, 172 So. 907 (1937); Lane v. Newton
145 Ga. 810, 89 S. E. 1083 (1916). Contra: Crawford v. Carper, 4 W. Va
56 (1870).
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Frauds,113 or is otherwise founded upon a moral consideration." 4
And an assumption of bona fide debts constitutes a valuable con-
sideration. 1 5
The ultimate test of value concerns the depletion of the debtor's
estate.'" In order to hold a transfer fraudulent it is not enough that
the value received for property is less than its worth in dollars.
There is still room in commercial transactions for bargaining at
arm's length."7 But there are limits to price inequality, and dis-
parity unexplained may fail to measure up to a "good considera-
tion." 118 Marriage suffices to validate a prenuptial agreement to
transfer," 9 and there are occasions within the family when services
rendered or other transactions will uphold a conveyance. 20 Trans-
fers by an insolvent debtor upon a promise to support, however, are
ordinarily vulnerable,' 2 ' and "love and affection" carries no
weight -9---a fitting commentary from the time of Lord Coke upon
113 Conveyance upon an oral trust of land. Ferguson v. Winchester
Trust Co., 267 Mass. 397, 166 N. E. 709 (1929). Cf. BIGELOW, Op. cit. supra
note 2, at 142-144; Bump, op. cit. supra note 3, § 203.
"-1 The authorities are not all in agreement. 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 295; De Bardeleben Coal Corp. v. Parker, 164 Miss. 728, 144 So.
474 (1932); Schaffer v. Stever, 153 Wash. 116, 279 Pac. 390 (1929); 1 GLENN,
op. cit. supra note 28, §§ 214 d, 291 b.
115 The value of the property, the amount of debts, and ability of the
grantee to perform are to be considered. Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v.
White, 12 Tenn. App. 583 (1930); and the corporation "trust fund" theory
must be kept in mind. Darcy v. Brooklyn Ferry Co., 196 N. Y. 99, 89 N. E.
461 (1909). See 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 305; Bmp, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 204. But cf. 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 282.
"16Bryce v. National City Bank, 17 F. Supp. 792 (S. D. N. Y. 1936),
afd, 93 F. 2d 300 (C. C. A. 2d 1937); 1 GLEN, op. cit. supra note 28, §§ 199,
274, 275.
117 Chesher v. Shafter Lake Clay Co., 45 N. M. 419, 115 P. 2d 636
(1941); Toomay v. Graham, 151 S. W. 2d 119 (Mo. 1941); Drury v. State
Capital Bank of Eastern Shore Trust Co., 163 Md. 84, 161 Atl. 176 (1932).
'I8 Willamette Grocery Co. v. Skiff, 118 Ore. 685, 248 Pac. 143 (1926);
Miller v. Smith, 109 Okla. 203, 235 Pac. 225 (1925); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra
note 28, §296.
"
09 Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 348 (U. S. 1833); Smith v. Allen, 5
Allen 454 (Mass. 1861); BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 574 n.; 1 GLENN,
op. cit. supra note 28, § 297; 33 HARV. L. REV. 303 (1919). Cf. BIGELOW, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 559 (post-nuptial settlements).
120 Third National Bank v. Guenther, 123 N. Y. 568, 25 N. E. 986
(1888) (salary paid to husband); People's Bank v. Barrow and Wiggens,
208 Ala. 433, 94 So. 600 (1922) (release of dower); Bullard v. Briggs, 7
Pick. 533 (Mass. 1829) (release of dower). 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28,
§ 298 (b); Bump, op. cit. supra note 3, § 211; BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 561.
121 Johnston's Heirs v. Harvy, 2 Pen & W. 82 (Pa. 1830). Cf Hapgood v.
Fisher, 34 Me. 407 (1852). See 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 277.
'
2 Park v. Battey, 80 Ga. 353, 5 S. E. 492 (1888); Slater v. Moore, 86
Va. 26, 9 S. E. 419 (1889).
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the commercial quality of a "good" consideration.125
Absence of consideration in a transfer has always been looked
upon askance, and if void or voidable for this reason a gift will
ordinarily not be saved because of the grantee's good faith.12' Nor
is it enough to meet the charge of fraud that consideration is ade-
quate for commercial purposes, if there is a lack of bona fides of
which the transferee is aware.125 But unless the conduct of the par-
ties is sufficient to convert a preference into a fraudulent convey-
ance,12 6 a transfer in payment of or security for a past debt is valid
at common law, regardless of knowledge by the transferee.' 7 Con-
duct may, however, disclose the grantor's mala fides, or impugn the
grantee's good faith.1 28 Herewith enter badges of fraud,'12 9 which
123 "And if consideration of nature of blood should be a good consider-
ation within this proviso, the statute would serve for little or nothing, and
no creditor would be sure of his debt." Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 81b
(1601).
124 Conveyances are voluntary, as to creditors, if supported by no con-
sideration, or according to some authority, by a consideration that is not
substantial. Cairo Lumber Co. v. Ladenberger, 313 Ill. App. 1, 39 N. E. 2d
596 (1942). Cf. Appeal of Ferguson, 117 Pa. 426, 11 Atl. 885 (1888); 14 Am.
St. Rep. 739; BIGELOW, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 532-538; 1 MOORE, op. cit.
supra note 15, at 336-344, 347-352. For discussion of the English rule re
voluntary transfers see page 595 infra.
125 Jones v. Simpson, 116 U. S. 609 (1886); Van Raalte v. Harrington,
101 Mo. 602 (1890) (knowledge inferred from circumstances). "But those
who undertake to impeach for mala fides a deed which has been executed
for valuable consideration, have, I think, a task of great difficulty to dis-
charge." Harman v. Richards, 10 Har. Ch. 81, 89 (1852). BumP, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 182 n. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §971 (5th ed. 1941).
128 Shelley v. Boothe, 73 Mo. 74 (1880); Bump, op. cit. supra note 3,
§ 172; 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, §§ 289 (a), 298 (a).
127 Bamberger v. Schoolfield, 160 U. S. 149 -(1895); BUMP, op. cit. supra
note 3, §167; 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 455; 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra
note 28, § 289. Cf. BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 670 n.
128 "All experience shows that positive proof of fraudulent acts, be-
tween debtor and creditor, is not generally to be expected, and it is for
that reason, among others, that the law allows in such controversies a
resort to circumstances as the means of ascertaining the truth." Wager v.
Hall, 16 Wall. 584, 601 (U. S. 1872). "According to general doctrines of the
law, one who purchases with notice, i. e., with knowledge of facts which
would put a prudent man upon inquiry leading to the truth, and a fortiori
one who purchases with knowledge of a fact in itself showing a defect or
taint in the title or in the sale, purchases without good faith. This is in
accordance with the very language of the statute of 13th Elizabeth; and it is
believed to be the better and the more general view of the meaning of the
term 'good faith' or 'bona fide' in the statutes generally against frauduleni
conveyances. The court of Massachusetts however has always treated thE
present question as standing upon a footing of its own, and refused to treal
a purchaser as brought within the terms of the law by reason merely oj
notice or even of knowledge on his part of the fraudulent intent of thE
vendor; creditors will not be authorized to upset the purchase, if that wa.,
for value, unless the purchaser actually participated in the fraud. For, ii
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since Coke's day have expanded the law of fraudulent conveyances
under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth and its successors.130
Ohio follows the standard doctrine that the presence of a valu-
able consideration will not absolve a transfer otherwise fraudu-
lent.'3 ' Inadequacy of price may point to fraud but does not pre-
is said, he may well have known the vendor's purpose without having par-
ticipated in it." BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 589. See Crowder v.
Crowder, 125 Va. 80, 99 S.E. 746 (1919); BumP, op. cit. supra note 3, §§
181-185. Cf. Parker v. Conner, 93 N. Y. 118 (1883). If the grantee par-
ticipates, creditors may reach all the property transferred even though full
value is paid. Baldwin v. Short, 125 N. Y. 553, 26 N. E. 928 (1891); or the
grantee may be held personally liable for the value of the property. Koell-
hoffer v. Peterson, 82 Misc. 180, 143 N.Y. Supp. 353 (1913); 27 HAxv. L. REV.
181 (1913); even though stolen while in the grantee's possession. Har-
greaves v. Tennis, 63 Neb. 356, 88 N.W. 486 (1901). After conveyance or
restoration of the property, he is not liable to creditors as a trustee. Swift
and Nicholos v. Holdridge, 10 Ohio 230 (1840); White v. Brocaw, 14 Ohio
St. 339 (1863); Funkhouser v. Lay, 78 Mo. 458 (1883); 1 GLENN, op. cit.
supra note 28, § 57. See 2 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 592, 615, 685n. Cf.
Clark v. Beecher, 154 U. S. 631 (1878).
120 "Badges or signs of fraud, are inferences drawn by experience, from
the customary conduct of mankind, which is in general marked by selfish-
ness, and distrust of his fellows." Terrell v. Green, 11 Ala. 207, 213 (1847).
'The reason why any act is denominated a badge of fraud is either because
its natural and probable tendency is to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors,
or because it is not in the usual course in which men acting in good faith
transact business. The first ground rests upon the principle that every man
is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence of his act; the
second ground is the result of experience. Whatever is out of the usual
course betrays contrivance to give color to the transaction." BUMP, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 31. 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 307 (a).
13 0 E.g., retention of possession by vendor of chattel. Twyne's case, 3
Coke 80b (1601); BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, c. XVII; 1 MooRE, op. cit.
supra note 15, at 247; 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 341n.; upon secret
trust in favor of the grantor. Pacific National Bank v. Windram, 133 Mass.
175 (1882); Bump, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 191, 192, 194; false recitals in
deeds, Bailey v. Cheatham, 4 Ky. L. REV. 351 (1882); 2 MOORE, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 605; illegal provisions contained in a deed of general assignment.
Tribune Co. v. Canger Floral Co., 312 Ill. App. 149, 37 N.E. 2d 906 (1941);
BIGELOW, op. cit. .supra note 2, at 307n.; Bump, op. cit. supra note 3, § 340;
sales in bulk. Hutchinson v. Walton, 119 W. Va. 709, 196 S.E. 20 (1938);
failure to record instrument. Claflin & Co. v. Freudenthal, 58 N.J. Eq. 298,
43 Atl. 529 (Ch. 1899); 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 251; conveyances
in anticipation of or pending suit. Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v. Amer-
ican Taxicabs, 344 Mo. 1200, 130 S.W. 2d 601 (1939). Cf. First National
Bank of Parsons v. Cottangim, 145 Kan. 330, 65 P. 2d 293, 294 (1937); con-
veyances not in the usual course of business. Maxwell v. Adams, 130 Me.
230, 154 Atl. 904 (1931); sales upon extended credit. Borland v. Walker,
7 Ala. 269 (1854); 1 MOORE, op cit. supra note 15, at 256; Re Kinship see
Russell v. Franks, 343 Mo. 159, 120 S.W. 2d 37 (1938); 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 248.
181 Hamill v. Wright, 5 Ohio N.P. 9, 8 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 467 (1897);
Underwood v. Lapp, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 582, 586 (1939).
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vent a "bargain." 112 Preferences within an assignment for credit-
ors 188 only became invalid through legislation.134  If made sepa-
rately from an assignment they are still protected when the trans-
feree has no knowledge of the design to prefer,1385 and a literal
construction of Sections 11104 and 11105 of the Ohio General Code
would exclude from their provisions preferential payments of
money,136 as distinguished from other types of preferential trans-
fers now expressly included.137 Preferences by insolvent corpora-
tions that have suspended business come under the interdiction of
the "trust fund" theory.38
Good faith of the parties is essential under either Section
8618 139 or 11105,140 and when present in the grantee will save a
132 Booker v. Rooker, 29 Ohio St. 1 (1875); Citizens National Bank v.
Wehrle, 18 Ohio C. C. 534, 544, 9 Ohio C. D. 330 (1897), af'd 61 Ohio St. 654,
57 N.E. 1131 (1899); Hamill v. Wright, 5 Ohio N.P. 9, 12, 8 Ohio Dec. (N.P.)
467 (1897).
33 Imposing no terms and exacting no delays. Stevenson v. Agry, 7
Ohio 247 (1836); Hull v. Jeffrey, 8 Ohio 390 (1838). Cf. Atkinson and
Rollins v. Jordan, Ellis & Co., 5 Ohio 293 (1832) (exacting release); Rep-
plier v. Orrich, 7 Ohio 246 (1836) (postponement for one year and distribu-
tion among such creditors who would agree to take a pro rata share); Suy-
dam and Jackson v. Martin, Wright 698 (Ohio 1834) (in trust partly for
benefit of assignor).
134 For history see National Bank of Commerce v. Gettinger, 68 Ohio
St. 389, 392-394, 67 N.E. 739 (1903). OHio GEN. CODE §§ 11104, 11105 (1938).
See Robertson v. Desmond & Ryan, 62 Ohio St. 487, 57 N.E. 235 (1900).
3:3 Carruthers v. Kennedy, 121 Ohio St. 8, 166 N.E. 801 (1929). See
Irwin v. Maple, 252 Fed. 10 (C.C.A. 6th 1918).
136 Bank v. Gettinger, supra note 134, at 400; Erie R.R. v. Fulton, 19
Ohio L. Abs. 70 (1935); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Johnson, 17 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
1, 41 Ohio C.C. 675 (1908), aff'd, 81 Ohio St. 566, 91 N.E. 1136 (1910). A sale
not in trust was not within the terms of earlier statutes. Atkinson v. Tom-
lison, 1 Ohio St. 237 (1853); Bagaley & Co. v. Waters, 7 Ohio St. 360 (1857).
137 "The case of National Bank of Commerce v. Gettinger... involved
the right of a creditor to receive payment from his debtor while such
debtor is insolvent, and it was held that Section 6343 was not intended to
prevent payments of the just amounts due to lawful creditors. It is true
that, at the time of the decision of this court in 1903, the proviso above re-
ferred to had not been added to the statutes." Carruthers v. Kennedy,
supra note 135, at 15. See also Bankruptcy Act § 60 (b), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (b).
138 Rouse v. Merchants' National Bank of Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 493
(1889); City Auto Stamping Co. v. State ex rel. Fulton, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 67
(1932). Cf. Erie R. R. v. Fulton, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 70 (1935).
,s9 Blackford v. Gaynor, 50 Ohio App. 494, 497, 198 N.E. 736 (1934);
Astor v. Wells, 4 Wheat. 466 (U.S. 1819). See Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio 469
(1824); Brown v. Cutler, 8 Ohio 142 (1837).
140 Bobilya v. Priddy, 68 Ohio St. 373, 67 N.E. 736 (1903); Detroit,
T. & I. Ry. v. Wright, 48 Ohio App. 305 (1933).
14' Lytle v. Baldinger, 84 Ohio St. 1, 95 N.E. 389 (1911) (Rev. Stat.
§ 6343); Harbine v. Harper, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 226 (1936) (Gen. Code § 11105).
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transfer for value which is otherwise fraudulent.14 1 Since the fraud-
ulent character of a transfer may depend upon circumstances,
142
badges of fraud may be resorted to in order to determine the in-
tent of the grantor 13 or want of bona fides in the grantee.
144
Within the family a transfer though subject to scrutiny is saved if
the consideration is valuable; '-5 but "love and affection" are not so
classed, 14 6 nor is an agreement for future support.147 Because the
proviso in Section 11105 which saves fraudulent transfers for lack
of the grantee's knowledge does not apply to Section 8618, a gift by
an insolvent debtor is constructively fraudulent under that section,
regardless of the donee's state of mind.
148
142 "In order that an act be constructively fraudulent it is essential
that it would, either in the particular case or in common experience, lead
to consequences equivalent to those following actual fraud." Stivens v.
Summers, 68 Ohio St. 421, 441, 67 N.E. 884 (1903) (Rev. Stat. § 6344). Bank
v. Trebein, 59 Ohio St. 316, 52 N.E. 834 (1898) (Rev. Stat. § 6344); Jamison
v. McNally, 21 Ohio St. 295, 304 (1871) (Section 17, Act 1859 as amended);
Jones v. Leeds, 7 Ohio N. P. 480, 10 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 173 (1900) (Rev. Stat.
§ 6344); Berry v. Haas, 12 Ohio C. C. 189 (1895) (creditor's bill); Cole v.
Merchants National Bank of Toledo, 15 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 315 (1907) (Rev.
Stat. § 6344). An intention to pay ultimately is no defense. Trimble v.
Doty, 16 Ohio St. 118 (1865).
143 Barr v. Hatch, 3 Ohio 527 (1828) (conveyance pending suit); Hoff-
man, Burneston & Co. v. Mackall, 5 Ohio St. 124, 134 (1855) (provisions in
a general assignment); Brinkerhoff v. Tracy, 55 Ohio St. 558, 45 N.E. 1100
(1897) (provisions in special assignment); Friedel v. Wolfe, 41 Ohio App.
564 (1931) (gratuitous transfer pending suit); Pride v. Andrew, 51 Ohio St.
405 (1894) (conveyance pending suit); Ferguson v. Gilbert, 16 Ohio St. 88
(1865) (conveyance upon a secret trust). OHio GN. CODE § 8617 (1938)
(conveyance upon trust for grantor); OHio GEN. CODE § 8619 (1938) (loans
of goods); OHio GEN. CODE § 8405 (1938) (retaining possession by seller);
O'Connell v. Cruise, 1 Handy 164, 12 Ohio Dec. Rep. 81 (Cin. Sup. Ct. 1854)
(sale of merchandise to clerk on credit).
'
4 Loudenback v. Foster, 39 Ohio St. 203 (1883) (conditions of sale);
Burbridge v. Seely, Morley & Co., Wright 359 (Ohio 1833) (retention of
possession). See Stewart v. Hopkins, 30 Ohio St. 502, 529 (1876) (re delay
in recording a mortgage).
14 Gould v. Cooper, 15 Ohio App. 223 (1919); Van, Ingen v. Peterson,
12 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 253, 21 Ohio C. Dec. 506 (1909), aff'd, 84 Ohio St. 473,
95 N.E. 1153 (1911); Grote v. Meyer, 6 Ohio D. Rep. 1025 (1881) (release
of dower); Singree v. Welch, 32 Ohio St. 320 (1877) (release of dower);
Whistler v. Allward, 57 Ohio App. 147, 12 N.E. 2d 299 (1936) (marriage);
Whitacre v. Redmond, 8 Ohio L. Rep. 165 (1910) (wife refraining from
suing for divorce). Cf. Huwe v. Knecht, 10 Ohio App. 487 (1919).
1
48 Burrage v. Beardsley, 16 Ohio 438 (1847); State ex rel. Fulton v.
Loar, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 156 (1934); Holmes v. Sullivan, 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 499.
(1885).
147 Akron Building & Loan Ass'n v. Foltz, 16 Ohio C. C. (N.S.) 299, 36
Ohio C. D. 572 (1908); Krider v. Koons, 5 Ohio C. C. 221, 3 Ohio C. D. 110
(1891).
'
48Huwe v. Knecht, 10 Ohio App. 487 (1919); State ex rel. Fulton v.
Loar, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 156 (1934); Allen v. Toth, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 457 (1935);
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The Uniform Act provides in Section 3 that:
Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation,
(a) When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as
a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property is
conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (b) When
such property, or obligation is received in good faith to se-
cure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not
disproportionately small as compared with the value of the
property, or obligation obtained.
This definition codifies existing law. Although it provides that
a "fair equivalent" shall be given in exchange, or that security must
not be "disproportionately small," these requirements are probably
but two aspects of the old rule that the reasonableness of consider-
ation shall depend upon the facts of the individual case. 4 9
The definition expressly preserves the common-law rule that
satisfaction of a preexisting debt supplies value.1 0 This may be
so even within the family.151 Likewise a moral consideration may
serve, 52 and marriage is a thing of value.153 "Natural affection,"
Ortman v. Falknor, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 312 (1938) Bank v. Weaver, 68 Ohio
App. 323, 40 N.E. 2d 953 (1941). Re nominal consideration. Vilas v. Chris-
topher, 33 Ohio L. Rep. 589 (1930). But it may be valid as to subsequent
creditors. Bank v. Ennes, Wright 604 (1834).
149 "What is fair consideration must, of course, be determined upon
the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Halsey v. Winant, 258
N. Y. 512, 523, 180 N.E. 253 (1932). See In re Rasmussen's Estate, 238 Wis.
334, 298 N.W. 172 (1941); Bianco v. Lay, 313 Mass. 444, 48 N.E. 2d 36 (1943);
Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros. Ass'n, 92 Utah 577, 70 P. 2d 738 (1937);
1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, §296. 42 MIcH. L. REV. 706-708 (1944); [1938]
Wis. L. REV. 341-349. Bridgman, Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in
Minnesota, 7 MiNN. L. REV. 453, 464 (1923).
150 Hirsh v. Levinson Bros., 117 N.J. Eq. 131, 174 Atl. 736 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1934); Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526, 46 P. 2d 674 (1933); In re
Handerson, 3 Fed. Supp. 92 (1933); Mason v. Mason, 296 Mich. 622, 296
N.W. 703 (1941); In re Gutenkunst's Estate, 232 Wis. 81, 286 N.W. 566 (1939).
Also see: Pauly v. Shultz, 199 Wis. 107, 225 N.W. 745 (1929), 46 HARV L.
REV. 404, 450 (1932); [1939] Wis. L. REV. 360, 371. A waiver of the bar of
the statute of limitations has been upheld: Central Hanover B. & T. Co. v.
United Traction Co., 95 F. 2d 50 (1938); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28,
§ 214d.
151 Baer v. Hespel, 258 Mich. 427, 242 N.W. 780 (1932); Klaseus v.
Meester, 173 Minn. 468, 217 N.W. 593 (1928); Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah
12, 126 P. 2d 1063 (1943); Share v. Trickle, 183 Wis. 1, 197 N.W. 329 (1924)
(release of dower). Cf. Folson v. Seapy, 10 F. 2d 322 (1926). If a convey-
ance to a wife is upset because of fraud, her dower rights are said to revive.
Beat v. Michelson, 221 Wis. 176, 226 N.W. 244 (1936).
152Ferguson v. Wincester Trust Co., 267 Mass. 397, 166 N.E. 709 (1929)
(statute of frauds); Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United Traction
Co., 95 F. 2d 50 (1938) (statute of limitations); Banking Com. v. Buchanan,
227 Wis. 544, 279 N.W. 71 (1938) (statute of limitations).
153 Bracklein v. McNamara, 147 Md. 17, 127 Atl. 497 (1925); American
Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783 (1929).
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however, has no more standing than before, 15 and the same holds
true for prior services voluntarily rendered,155 or for promises of
future, support.'" Nor is an executory consideration a "fair equiva-
lent." 157 Or course, a voluntary transfer is not supported by a fair
consideration,'" nor is one where the value is nominal. 59
But in addition to value received or given, a transaction to be
sustained under the Act must be performed in "good faith"-a
qualification which saves the test from the starkness of sheer money
value.160 It also raises afresh the position of badges of fraud. This
is especially so in view of the Commissioner's statement that "In the
Act as drafted all possibility of presumption of law as to intent is
avoided." I6' Yet insofar as "good faith" is descriptive of a debtor's
state of mind or of a grantee's knowledge, it would seem that con-
ditions which accompany a transfer retain such weight as evidence,
either for or against good faith, as past experience justifies.1 62
14Cooper v. Cooper, 22 Tenn. App. 473, 124 S.W. 2d 264 (1939).
155 Pittsburg Bank v. Purcell, 286 Pa. 114, 133 Atl. 31 (1926); Kessler
v. Sooy, 110 N.J. Eq. 559, 160 Atl. 574 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932), affirming
108 N.J. Eq. 86, 154 At. 108 (Ch. 1931); Kowal v. Sudol, 132 N.J. Eq. 61,
26 A. 2d 795 (Ch. 1942).
156 Petition of National Bank of N.Y., 269 App. Div. 1040, 58 N.Y.S. 2d
620 (2d Dep't 1945); 5 U. OF PA. L. REv. 161 (1856).
157 Angers v. Sabatinelli, 235 Wis. 422, 293 N.W. 173 (1941). An en-
forceable promise has been held to be sufficient: Schlecht v. Schlecht, 168
Minn. 168, 209 N.W. 883 (1926); Hollander v. Gautier, 114 N.J. Eq. 485, 168
Atl. 860 (Ch. 1933). Cf. McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act 46 HARv. L. REV. 404 447 (1933). Note, Executory Consid-
eration as "Fair Consideration" under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, 39 Mici. L. REv. 654 (1941).
15S Commissioners' Prefatory Note: "Certain conveyances, such as a
gift by the insolvent, are declared fraudulent irrespective of intent." See
Bennett v. Rodman & English, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 355 (1932), aff'd, 62 F. 2d 1064
(1932).
159 Emni v. Patane, 128 Misc. 901, 220 N.Y.Supp. 495 (Sup. Ct. 1927);
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P. 2d 513 (1935).
160 Commissioners' note, 44 A.B.A. REP. 343 (1919): "The cases relat-
ing to the subject of this section (3) usually deal with the amount of the
consideration as indicating whether there is a fraudulent intent on the part
of the grantor or collusion on the part of the grantee. It is submitted that
the real question in such cases is, the good faith of the grantee, and whether
the consideration given by him is a reasonable equivalent for the property
received." Hence a preference received in bad faith is voidable: Geller v.
Johnsen, 95 N.J. Eq. 516, 123 Atl. 725 (Ch. 1924).
161 Prefatory Note, 9 UN17oRm LAws ANN. 326 (1938).
182 Constructive fraud is inferentially recognized in Section 9(2) as to
"a purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given less than a fair
consideration." (Emphasis supplied.) And the Commissioners' note to
Section 44 A.B.A. Rep. 343 (1919), insofar as it affects voluntary transfers,
reads: "In dealing with the subject of the section our courts have usually
treated a voluntary conveyance by an insolvent as indicating an 'irre-
buttable presumption of fraudulent intent.' As stated in the Prefatory Note,
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While the Act is mainly silent in this regard, Section 11 specifically
declares that "in any case not provided for ... the rules of law and
equity . . .shall govern." This reservation seems to support the
conclusion that Lord Coke's admonition in Twyne's case that mer-
chants should guard the openness of their dealings, 6 '3 is preserved
under this most modern successor to the Statute of 13 Elizabeth.i6
So, the suspicion created by retention of property by a debtor-
transferor 16 5 or the reservation of a secret trust 166 should still have
its relevancy, whether it bears specifically upon the good faith of
the debtor or of the transferee. PresumptiQns, rejected upon the
legal level, return as inferences from circumstances taught by busi-
ness experience.16 7
Although the definition of a "fair consideration" contained in
Section 3 of the Act is seemingly directed toward transfers by debt-
ors, its terms are broad enough to include subgrantees and attaching
this awkward method of treating the subject arose from the wording of
the 13th of Elizabeth. That statute renders void those conveyances only
which are made with the 'intent' to 'hinder, delay, and defraud' creditors.
To avoid a gift made by an insolvent where no actual intent to defraud
existed, it was necessary to 'presume as a matter of law' an intent to de-
fraud." The matter is now handled by definition in section 4.
163 Attorney General v. Twyne, 3 Co. f[ 806, f1 81a (1601). "So a good
consideration doth not suffice, if it be not also bona fide: and therefore,
reader, when any gift shall be to you in satisfaction of a debt, by one who
is indebted to others also; 1st, Let it be made in a public manner, and before
the neighbours, and not in private, for secrecy is a mark of fraud. 2nd
Let the goods and chattels be appraised by good people to the very value,
and take a gift in particular in satisfaction of your debt. 3rd, Immediately
after the gift, take possession of them; for continuance of the possession
in the donor, is a sign of trust."
164 General Kontrolar Co. Inc. v. Allen, 124 F. 2d 123, 126 (1942), quot-
ing report of House Committee on the Judiciary in re adoption of the Section
7 of the Uniform Act in 123, 126 (1942), Section 67d (11 USC 107d 1940) of
the Bankruptcy Act: "this was done because the Uniform Act is largely
declaratory of the better decisions of American State courts construing the
statute of Elizabeth... It has been adopted in a number of States, and may
in time be adopted in most of the States."
165 Takacs v. Kapela, 264 App. Div. 871 (2d Dept. 1942). 35 N.Y.S. 2d
502. McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
46 HARV. L. REV. 404, 406: "at any rate, it seems to be assumed without ex-
ception that conveyances may stand or fall according to the local law of
fraudulent retention of possession without reference to the Fraudulent
Conveyance Act." See note 245 supra.
166 McCreary's Estate v. Pitts, 354 Pa. 347, 47 A. 2d 235 (1946); State
ex rel. v. Nashville Trust Co., 190 S.W. 2d 785 (Tenn. 1945).
167 For analogous treatment: section 36-406, Revised Statutes of Ne-
braska (1943), provides that "the question of fraudulent intent" in fraud-
ulent transfers "shall be deemed a question of fact, and not of law." See:
Bokhoof v. Stewart, 89 N.W. 759, 760 (Neb. 1902); Farmers' & Merchants'
Nat. Bank v. Mosher, 63 Neb. 130, 88 N.W. 552 (1901); Bank of Commerce
v. Schlotfeldt, 40 Neb. 212, 58 N.W. 727 (1894).
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creditors of grantees. So construed the section extends to these
persons the protection formerly accorded them,168 without reference
to the saving provisions in Section 11.169
CONVEYANCES BY AN INSOLVENT
Absence of a "fair consideration" for a transfer by a debtor has
given rise to two rules regarding voluntary transfers of property.
According to the earlier English rule, a gift by an indebted person
is fraudulent regardless of his solvency or good faith.70 The fact of
indebtedness at the time of gift raises a conclusive presumption of
fraud.1'7 1 As long as existing debts remain outstanding the transfer
may be attacked, even by creditors whose claims arose subsequently
to the gift.1'7 2 A strict interpretation of the term "creditors," how-
ever, excludes the holder of a contingent claim. 7 8
168 In re Mullen, 101 Fed. 413 (1900); Holmes v. Gardner, 50 Ohio St.
167, 33 N.E. 644 (1893); Swift and Nichols v. Holdridge, 10 Ohio 231 (1840).
But the authorities are not all in accord. See Notes, 32 L.R.A. 69 (1911);
57 L.R.A. 891 (1915); 63 A.L.R. 1367 (1929); 5 B.R.C. 277 (1916). Section
67d (6) of the Bankruptcy Act expressly protects the bona fide lienor of
the grantee. See also Bankruptcy Act Section 70e (1). For protection af-
forded subgrantees prior to the Uniform Act see Anderson v. Roberts, 18
Johns. 515 (N.Y. 1820); Green v. Robins, 29 N.D. 131, 150 N.W. 561 (1914),
63 U. of PA. L. REV. 574 (1915); 1 GLENN, Op. cit. sumpra note 28, § 236 n.; 2
MOORE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 725-727.
169 This construction is also implicit in the provisions of Sections 9 and
10 of the Act. The protection afforded in Section 9 to a "purchaser for fair
consideration without notice of the fraud" has been held to include an at-
taching creditor of the grantee. See note 282 infra. 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra
note 28, § 238.
170 Townshend v. Windham, 2 Ves. Sr. 1, 10 (Ch. 1750); Reade v. Liv-
ingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481 (N.Y. 1818). This doctrine has been overruled
both in England and in some states either by later cases or by statute. Free-
man v. Pope, L.R. 5 Ch. App. 538, 541 (1870); Seward v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 406
(N.Y. 1826); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw §265; N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAW § 36; Conway
v. Raphel, 102 N.J. Eq. 531, 532, 141 Atl. 804 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928); Lloyd
v. Fulton, 91 U.S. 479 (1875). But it is still the rule in some states. VA.
CODE ANN. § 5185 (1942); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3987 (1943); 25 VA. L. REV.
862 (1939).
171 The existing debts must have been substantial. Current expenses
or debts inconsiderable in relation to the grantor's estate are not sufficient.
Buchanan v. McNinch, 3 S.C. 498 (1872).
'
72 Reade v. Livingston, 2 Ves. Sr. 1 (Oh. 1750).
178 A holder of a note is not considered to be a creditor of his accom-
odation indorser. Severs v. Dodson, 53 N.J. Eq. 633, 34 AtI. 7 (Ct. Err. & App.
1895). The rule is changed under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.
Conway v. Raphel, 102 N.J. Eq. 531, 141 At. 804 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928);
1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 332, HANNA AND McLAuGHLIN, CASES ON
CREDITOR'S RIGHTS 96 n. 2 (3d ed. 1939); 1 GLENN, CASES ON CREDITORS'
RIGHTS 126 n. 28 (1940). It has also been modified by decisions. See Bibb v.
Freeman, 59 Ala. 612 (1877) where a covenantee of general warranty was
considered a creditor from date of the covenant. Cf. Bridgeford v. Riddell,
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On the other hand by the majority rule, indebtedness at the
time of gift raises merely an inference of fraudulent intent which
may be rebutted by proof of the debtor's solvency.17 4 In some states
if insolvency is shown, subsequent creditors may attack the transfer
while existing debts remain unpaidY 5 The intention to defraud ex-
isting creditors is extended to subsequent ones."6 In other states
subsequent creditors may attack only if there is an actual intention
to defraud them. 77
Ohio follows the majority rule that a voluntary conveyance may
not be set aside upon the mere showing of grantor's indebtedness.
The need to retain assets clearly sufficient in amount to pay debts
has been noted. 7 18 In the absence of an actual intention to defraud
their class, subsequent creditors 7 9 may not complain.,' The good
faith of the parties will not save a gift by an insolvent.'8' It is dif-
55 Ill. 261 (1870). Also see: Peterson v. Wahlquist, 125 Nev. 247, 249 N.W.
678 (1993); 34 COL. L. REV. 373 (1934); Ganun v. Palmer, 216 N.Y. 603, 111
N.E. 223 (1916).
174 Lloyd v. Fulton, 91 U.S. 479 (1875); Salmon v. Bennett, 1 Conn. 525
(1816); Adams v. Deem, 296 Ill. App. 571, 16 N.E. 2d 817 (1938); Goodman
v. Wineland, 61 Md. 449 (1883); Cole v. Tyler, 65 N.Y. 73 (1875). The nom-
inal value equal to or greater than the amount of the debt is immaterial if
subsequent events show that the property retained was insufficient to dis-
charge all the liabilities. Cairo Lumber Co. v. Landenberger, 313 Ill. App.
1, 39 N.E. 2d 596 (1941). And see BUMP, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 259, 260.
175 GLENN, op. cit. ,supra note 28, at 322; BumP, op. cit. supra note 3, at
296; MAY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 519; 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 194.
See Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
176 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 324; 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 186, 194.
177 Harlan v. Maglaughlin, 90 Pa. 293 (1879); 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 186, 194. Concerning indebtedness on a running account see Note,
ANN. CAS. 1913C 1376. Cf. 1 MOORE, id. at 183.
178 See note 90 supra.
379 Evans v. Lewis, 30 Ohio St. 11 (1876); Crumbaugh v. Kruger, 2 Ohio
St. 373, 379 (1853); Creed v. Lancaster Bank, I Ohio St. 1 (1852); Walston
v. McCabe, 11 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 26, 31 (1911); Hedrick v. Gregg, 8 Ohio N.P.
24, 10 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 462 (1901); Robinson v. Von Dolcke, 1 Ohio N.P.
429, 3 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 107 (1894). A secret trust constitutes a continuing
fraud. Webb's Adm'r v. Roff, 9 Ohio St. 430, 435 (1859); Bowlus v. Shana-
barger, 19 Ohio C. C. 137, 10 Ohio C. D. 167 (1899). But subsequent credi-
tors probably share in a distribution under Section 11104. See Lally v. Farr,
6 Ohio N.P. 73, 9 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 119 (1899); Re Kohler, 159 Fed. 871
(1908). Cf. Burt v. Keyes, 4 Fed. Cas. 858 No. 2212 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1861).
See note 222 infra.
180 In an action by an administrator against his intestate's murderer,
who conveyed property prior to suit, the defendant was classed as a sub-
sequent creditor. Sechrist v. Veres, 9 Ohio Op. 492, 2 Ohio Supp. 126
(C.P. 1937).
181 See note 148 supra. See also Squire v. Cramer, 64 Ohio App. 169,
28 N.E. 2d 516 (1940); Ursak v. Spivanick, 56 Ohio App. 434, 10 N.E. 2d 1017
(1937).
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ferent, of course, if there is consideration. 8 2
Section 4 of the Uniform Act condemns gifts by insolvents, pro-
viding that "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred
by a person who is or will thereby be rendered insolvent is fraudu-
lent as to creditors without regard to his intent if the conveyance
is made or the obligation incurred without a fair consideration."
Through the requirement of insolvency this definition adopts the
majority rule as to gifts by solvent debtors. The use of the term
"creditors," rather than "present or future creditors" as in Section
7, or of creditors and "other persons who become creditors" in Sec-
tion 5, indicates that under Section 4 only present creditors may set
aside a conveyance. 83 The definition of insolvency in Section 2 is
sufficiently broad to raise a doubt that the rule in Ohio regarding
the amount of property to be retained would be seriously affected.
Cases which involve actual intent to defraud are dealt with in a
subsequent section.8
CONVEYANCES BY PERSONS IN BUSINESS
Under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth a special application of the
gift rule has been developed for the business man. It is considered
to be a badge of fraud for him to make a voluntary conveyance if
in so doing he retains so little capital that the risk of his business is
cast upon his present or subsequent creditors. In his case it is not
an adequate defense that at the time of conveyance his assets were
sufficient to satisfy his debts.'8 5 Nor need his intention to defraud
be actual as distinguished from constructive.186 The rule has specific
application when the debtor is about to enter into a new business
that involves more than the ordinary amount of risk, 1 8 or one in
which he is inexperienced. 18 8 It applies as well, though, to an expan-
'
8 2 Bobilya v. Priddy, 68 Ohio St. 373, 67 N.E. 736 (1903); Burgett v.
Burgett, 1 Ohio 469 (1824); Blackford v. Gaynor, 50 Ohio App. 494, 198 N.E.
736 (1934). Re knowledge of an indorser, see Cole v. Bank, 15 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 315, 341, 342 (1907), aff'd, Bank v. Newton, 82 Ohio St. 444, 92 N.E.
119 (1910); Mitchell v. Gazzam, 12 Ohio 315, 336 (1843).
-3 Bank of Dallas v. Peterson, 218 Wis. 41, 260 N.W. 240, 242 (1935);
Bridgman, Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in Minnesota, 7 MiNN. L.
REv. 530, 531 (1922-23). Bankruptcy Act Section 67 d (2) (a) [11 U.S.C.
§ 107d (2) (a) (1946)] specifically limits a similar provision to "creditors
existing at the time of such transfer or obligation." 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
§ 67.34 (1942).
'
8 4,See infra page 603.
18 5 Mackay v. Douglas, L.R. 14 Eq. 106 (1872); Ex parte Russell, 19 Ch.
D. 588, 601 (1882).
188 See BIGELOW, op cit. supra note 2, at 114.
187Mackay v. Douglas, L.R. 14 Eq. 106 (1872).
188Ex parte Russell, 19 Ch. D. 588 (1882). See Todd v. Nelson, 109
N.Y. 316, 16 N.E. 588 (1888).
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sion of an old business or to the incurring of extensive liabilities.' 9
The time sequence between the gift and business venture is im-
portant 9 but not necessarily controlling.'0 The uncertainty of
the business, its size and the donor's business experience bear upon
the reasonableness of the amount of capital retained.19 2
A conveyance fraudulent under these circumstances can be set
aside by existing creditors, and by subsequent ones, too, if their
class is actually contemplated. 103 Such actual intention may be
proved by badges of fraud, such as immediate entrance into the
business,0 but may not be imputed if the facts are consistent with
honesty.193 Knowledge of the prior conveyance by subsequent
creditors, of course, bars recovery.196
Although Ohio has held that subsequent creditors may upset a
voluntary conveyance made by an insolvent debtor who had them
in mind,19 7 it seemingly has not developed a separate doctrine that
the retention of an unreasonably small capital by a business man
will constitute such a fraudulent intent.19 8
Section 5 of the Uniform Act states that:
Every conveyance made without fair consideration
when the person making it is engaged or is about to engage
in a business or transaction for which the property remain-
L89 Ware v. Gardner, L. R. 7 Eq. 317 (1869). Crossley v. Elworthy,
L.R. 12 Eq. 158 (1871); MAY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 52; 1 GLENN, Op. cit.
supra note 28, at 334, 335.
"10 Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 229, 251 (U.S. 1823); BIGELOW, op. Cit.
supra note 2, at 231; 1 GLENN, Op. cit. supra note 28, § 335.
191 In re Pearson, 3 Ch. D. 807 (1876) (Fifteen years elapsed between
the conveyance and the engaging in trade).
192 Ex parte Russell, 19 Ch. D. 588 (1882); Mackay v. Douglas, L. R. 14
Eq. 106 (1872). But not unforeseen losses as by fire or flood. Crossley v.
Elworthy, L. R. 12 Eq. 158, 167 (1871); Cairo Lumber Co. v. Landenberger,
313 Ill. App. 1, 39 N.E. 2d 596 (1941); Hunters v. Waite, 3 Gratt. 25, 45 (Va.
1846). See Spiret v. Willows, 3 De. J. & S. 293 (Ch. 1865).
193 1 MOORE, Op. cit. supra note 15, at 188-190; BIGELOW, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 103n (a); Bump, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 291-293; MAY op. cit.
supra note 4, at 521.
'19 BUMP, op. cit. supra note 3, § 291. Also see Mullen v. Wilson, 44 Pa.
413 (1863); Case v. Phelps, 39 N.Y. 164 (1868); Mackay v. Douglas, supra
note 185; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 25 N.J. Eq. 194 (Ch. 1874).
195 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 189-190.
1G Knowledge here may be either actual or constructive, except that
actual fraud leading the creditor not to investigate requires actual knowl-
edge on the part of the creditor. Sikes v. First State Bank of Decatur, 197
S.W. 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). See German-American National Bank of
Lincoln v. Martin, 277 IMI. 629, 115 N.E. 721 (1917); Van Nostrand & Co. v.
Virginia Zinc & Chemical Corp., 126 Va. 131, 101 S.E. 65 (1919).
'197 Evans v. Lewis, 30 Ohio St. 11 (1876); Creed v. Lancaster Bank, 1
Ohio St. 1 (1852).
9s BumP, op. cit. supra note 3, § 258, refers to Crumbaugh v. Kugler, 2
Ohio St. 374 (1853), and Miller v. Wilson, 15 Ohio 108 (1846).
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ing in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably
small capital, is fraudulent as to creditors and as to other
persons who become creditors during the continuance of
such business or transaction without regard to his actual
intent.
The rule thus stated in effect codifies existing doctrine, 19 9 but as
to both present and to subsequent creditors bases its conclusion of
fraud upon economic conditions as distinguished from a state of
mind.20 0 Consequently insufficiency of assets may not be explained
away.201 But the results of the cases have probably not been
altered,202 since circumstances which formerly would have sustained
.a finding of fraud, still enter into the determination of what consti-
tutes an "unreasonably small capital." 203
CONVEYANCES BY A PERSON ABOUT TO INCUR DEBTS
Voluntary conveyances by persons who expect to incur debts
.may be fraudulent under the Act. This is the case when the debtor
-knows that his contemplated indebtedness will exceed his ability
to pay.204 The rule then applies that subsequent creditors may avoid
voluntary conveyances which are made with them in mind.2 0 5 If the
-evidence shows that the donor intended to defraud his future credit-
ors, existing ones may object,206 but when the intention to defraud
is confined to existing creditors, the position of subsequent ones is
-not uniformly clear. The so-called English rule aided them as long
.as existing debts remained unpaid,2 0 7 and in any event circum-
19 Expansion of an old business suffices. McBride v. Bertsch, 58 F. 2d
797, ajfd, 58 F. 2d 799 (C. C. A. 6th 1932); or even continuance of the old
one upon the same scale. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union National Bank, 313
Pa. 467, 169 Ati. 209 (1933). Knowledge of the transfer is a defense. Long
v. True, 149 Tenn. 673, 261 S.W. 669 (1924); but not constructive knowledge
based upon recording. McBride v. Bertsch, supra. It is not necessary that
-the donor be rendered insolvent. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union National
Bank, supra. See 44 A.B.A. REP. 343 n. 3 (1919); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note
28, §§ 334, 335.
20 0 Kearney Plumbing Supply Co. v. Gland, 105 N.J. Eq. 723, 149 Atl.
-530 (Ch. 1930). The provision is constitutional. McBride v. Bertsch, supra
note 199.20 Kearney Plumbing Supply Co. v. Gland, supra note 200.
202 See 44 A.B.A. REP. 343 n. 3 (1919); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28,
§ 335.
203 See 1 GLENN, up. cit. supra note 28, §§ 334, 335.
204 Morrill v. Kilner, 113 Il. 318 (1885); Matthai v. Heather, 57 Md. 483
(1881); In re Ridler, 22 Ch. D. 74 (1882); Bump, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 290,
291. 293.
20 5 BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 103 n. a (II). See Wilson v.
:Stevens, 129 Ala. 630, 29 So. 678 (1900); Bishop v. Redmond, 83 Ind. 157, 159
(1882); Barkworth v. Palmer, 118 Mich. 50, 55, 76 N.W. 151 (1898).
206 Spirett v. Willows, 3 De J. & S. 293 (1865).
207Freeman v. Pope, 5 L. R. Ch. 538 (1870); extended by Taylor v
,Coenen, 1 Ch. D. 636 (1876); Jenkyn v. Vaughn, 3 Drew. 419, 425 (Ch. 1856);
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stances which would sustain an intent to defraud existing creditors
may include subsequent ones."08 Thus retention of possession by
the donor 2 0 9 or the immediate incurring of debts 210 are evidentiary.
When fraud as to existing creditors is actual as distinguished
from constructive,2 1 1 some courts permit subsequent creditors to
object.21- Others require a direct showing of fraud as to their
class.2 1 3 Constructive fraud 1", must be directed toward the subse-
quent creditor. The intent at the time of conveyance governs,2 15 and
knowledge of the conveyance will defeat the right of a subsequent
creditor.2 1 Insolvency or indebtedness of the grantor when the
conveyance is made is not a prerequisite,2 1 7 nor does insolvency,
present or future, necessarily establish intent to incur debts beyond
1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 322. See 37 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1924); 18
ENG. RUL. CAs. 79 (1899).
208 Claflin v. Mess, 30 N. J. Eq. 211, 212 (Ch. 1878); Johnston v. Zane,
11 Gratt. 552, 559 (Vo. 1854); BumP, op. cit. supra note 3, § 295. See Redfield
v. Buck, 35 Conn. 328, 338 (1868).
209 Carter v. Grimshaw, 49 N. H. 100, 106 (1869); BumP, op. cit. supra
note 3, §291; 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 346.
21OHerschfeldt v. George, 6 Mich. 456 (1859); Johnson v. Zane, 11
Gratt. 552, 561 (Va. 1854); Rose v. Brown, 11 W. Va. 122 (1877); Barling v.
Bishopp, 29 Beav. 417, 420 (1860).
2"1 Rudy v. Austin, 56 Ark. 73, 19 S. W. 11 (1892); Johnston v. Zane,
11 Gratt, 552, 559 Va. 1854); BUMP, op. cit. supra note 3, § 295. See Redfield
212 Day v. Cooley, 118 Mass. 524 (1875); Washington National Bank v.
Beatty, 77 N. J. Eq. 252, 76 Atl. 442 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910); Marshall v. Roll,
139 Pa. 399, 20 Atl. 999 (1891); 1 GLENN, OP. cit. supra note 28, § 324; BiGE-
LOW, op. cit. ,supra note 2, at 104-105 n. a III. See Fish v. East, 114 F. 2d 177
(C. C. A. 10th 1940); Nicholas v. Ward, 1 Head 324 (Tenn. 1858).
213 Bates v. Kleve, 225 Iowa 255, 280 N. W. 501 (1938); Fullington v.
Northwestern Importers & Breeders Assoc., 48 Minn. 490, 51 N. W. 475
(1892). There is no requirement that the grantor have specific debts in
mind. Winchester v. Charter, 94 Mass. 606, 611 (1866).
2- Bates v. Kleve, supra note 213; BUMP, op. cit. supra note 3, § 295;
BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 100. See State v. Martin, 77 Conn. 142, 58
At. 745 (1904).
23'Phifer v. Erwin, 100 N. C. 59, 6 S. E. 672 (1888); Sommerville v.
Horton, 4 Yerg. 541, 548 (Tenn. 1833). See Rose v. Colter, 76 Ind. 590
(1881); Weller v. Wayland, 17 Johns. 102 (N. Y. 1819). In the case of a
voluntary conveyance it is the intent of the grantor, not the knowledge of
the grantee, that controls. Partridge v. Goop, 2 Amb. 595, 598 (Ch. 1758).
210 Knowledge may be either actual or constructive, except that actual
fraud leading the creditor not to investigate requires actual knowledge on
the part of the creditor. Sikes v. First State Bank of Decatur, 197 S. W.
227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). See German-American National Bank of Lin-
coin v. Martin, 277 Ill. 629, 115 N. E. 721 (1917); Van Nostrand & Co. v.
Virginia Zinc and Chemical Corp., 126 Va. 131, 101 S. E. 65 (1919); BUMP.
op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 293, 462.
217 Morritz v. Hoffman, 35 Ill. 553, 558 (1864); Matthai v. Heather,
supra note 204; Stileman v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 477, 480 (Ch. 1742).
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ability to pay.218 Inadequacy of consideration may result in a con-
veyance that is voluntary in part. 19
As stated in the previous section, for a subsequent creditor in
Ohio to avail himself of a fraudulent conveyance, he must show that
his class was contemplated 2 20 when the conveyance was made.221
Proof of this intention may rest upon circumstances, 222 for it is said
that one is presumed to intend the necessary consequences of his
act.223 So stated, the rule has been recognized as applicable to a
voluntary conveyance made with the intention of incurring debts.
Solvency at the time of conveyance is no defense.2
24
Section 6 of the Uniform Act provides that:
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred
without fair consideration when the person making the
conveyance or entering into the obligation intends or be-
lieves that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay
as they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and future
creditors.
This provision codifies the rule just discussed.22 5 The state of
mind may be proved by badges of fraud,226 but insolvency alone is
not sufficient evidence; 227 nor will recordation of a deed charge a
218 Rudy v. Austin, 56 Ark. 73, 19 S.W. 11 (1892); DeFeo v. Hindinger,
98 Conn. 578, 120 Atl. 314 (1923); Lyman v. Cessford, 15 Iowa 229, 231
(1863); In re Lane-Fox, 2 Q. B. 508, (1900); Smith v. Tatton, 6 L. R. Ir. 32
(1879). See Pelham v. Aldrich, 8 Gray 515 (Mass. 1857); Cole v. Brown,
114 Mich. 396, 72 N. W. 247 (1897); Hagerman v. Buchanan, 45 N. J. Eq.
292, 17 Atl. 946 (Ct. Err. & App. 1889); Bump. op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 292,
295. A showing of sufficient debts at time of the conveyance may also be
used as evidence of fraud as to subsequent creditors. Rudy v. Austin, supra
at 81.
219 Norton v. Norton, 59 Mass. 524, 530 (1850); BUMP, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 265.
220 See note 179, supra.
22 1Robinson v. Von Dolcke, 1 Ohio N. P. 429, 3 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 107
(1894).
222 First National Bank v. Trebein, 59 Ohio St. 316, 52 N. E. 834 (1898);
Jamison v. McNally, 21 Ohio St. 295, 304 (1871); Sechrist v. Veres, 9 Ohio
Op. 492, 497 (C. P. 1937).
223First National Bank v. Trebein, supra note 222; Sechrist v. Veres,
supra note 222; Jones v. Leeds, 7 Ohio N. P. 480 (1900); Maas v. Miller,
58 Ohio St. 483, 51 N. E. 158 (1898); Jamison v. McNally, supra note 222.
224Webb v. Roff, 9 Ohio St. 430, 435 (1859). See Hedrick v. Gregg, 8
Ohio N. P. 24, 10 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 462 (1901); Bowlus v. Shanabarger, 19
Ohio C. C. 137, 10 Ohio Dec. 167 (1900).
225 See Cram v. Cram, 262 Mass. 509, 160 N. E. 337 (1928); Decker's
Estate, 149 Misc. 364, 268 N. Y. Supp. 280 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Hartnett v.
Doyle, 16 Tenn. App. 302, 64 S. W. 2d 227 (1932).
226 Hartnett v. Doyle, supra note 225.
22, Anderson v. Anderson, 103 P. 2d 452 (Cal. App. 1940).
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subsequent creditor with knowledge.2 28 The Act seems clearly to
modify the rule of states, such as Ohio,220 which requires a specific
showing of fraud as to subsequent creditors.
2 30
CONVEYANCES MADE WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD
When transfers were avoided under the Statute of Elizabeth
for actual intention to defraud, the main difficulty concerned the
rights of subsequent creditors. It was held generally that actual
fraud as to a subsequent creditor will enable him to upset a con-
veyance,"' and further assistance has been granted to him. As
noted,23 2 the English rule aided him as long as existing debts re-
mained unpaid.23 3 By the Massachusetts rule 231 subsequent credit-
ors may upset a fraudulent conveyance although their class is not
within the actual intention of the grantor. In other states subse-
quent creditors must be within the grantor's fraudulent intent.
2 5 If
the transfer is gratuitous, knowledge of the fraud by the grantee is
228 Hartnett v. Doyle, supra note 225. It has been suggested that actual
notice to the subsequent creditor would not defeat his claim. COLLIER,
BANKRuPTcY, op. cit. supra note 10, § 67.36 n. 5.
229 In Webb v. Roff, 9 Ohio St. 430, 435 (1859), the rule is stated as
follows: "Thus, if one possessed of property and of good credit should make
a voluntary conveyance of his property with a view to becoming subse-
quently indebted, and should by means of his former reputation contract
debts shortly after the conveyance of his property, the creditors being
ignorant of the fact, the fraud might well be regarded as directed specific-
ally against such subsequent creditors."
230 There is contra authority. Oakford Realty Co. v. Boarman, 156 Md.
65, 143 Atl. 644 (1928); Neeb v. Atlantic Mill & Lumber Realty Co., 176
Md. 297, 5 A. 2d 283 (1939). It should be apparent that upon occasions sec-
tions 5 and 6 may apply in the alternative. Williams v. Eubler, 222 App.
Div. 561, 227 N. Y. Supp. 40 (2d Dep't 1928); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28,
at 580.
2 33 Bump, op. cit. supra note 3, § 24; BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at
85-86.
2.32 See note 211, supra. But actual intent as to future creditors will be
sufficient even when no present debts are unpaid at the time of conveyance.
Murphy v. Abraham, 15 Ir. Ch. 371 (1863); In re Pearson, 3 Ch. D. 807
(1876).
2 33The rule in some states based the right of subsequent creditors to
sue upon the continuance of the debtor's insolvency as distinguished from
the survival of unpaid debts. BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 103 n. (a).
234Fish v. East, 114 F. 2d 177 (C. C. A. 10th 1940); Hannaford v.
Charles River Trust Co., 248 Mass. 225, 142 N. E. 822 (1924); Washington
National Bank v. Beatty, 77 N. J. Eq. 252, 76 Atl. 442 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910);
Nicholas v. Ward, 1 Head 324 (Tenn. 1858); House v. Johnson, 19 Colo. App.
524, 76 Pac. 743 (1904); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 324; BIGELOW, Op.
cit. supra note 2, at 104-105 n. a III. See Marshall v. Roll, 139 Pa. 399, 20 Atl.
999 (1891); Moore v. Bay, 284 U. S. 4 (1931); 45 HAI. L. REv. 579 (1932).
235 Bates v. Kleve, 225 Iowa 255, 280 N. W. 501 (1938); Fullington v.
Northwestern Importers & Breeders Assoc., 48 Minn. 490, 51 N. W. 475
(1892).
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not controlling,2 6 but a transfer for a valuable consideration may
not be upset if the transferee is innocent. 2 7 Intention at the date of
transfer governs.
2
1
8
Ohio, as stated, follows the general rule that knowledge by a
donee is immaterial,2 39 but it is otherwise when a valuable consider-
ation is involved.240 Consistently with its general doctrine, subse-
quent creditors must show that the fraudulent intent includes
them.241
Section 7 of the Uniform Act reads:
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred
with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed
in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future
creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future credit-
ors.
Although the section is silent as to the grantee's participation
in the fraud,'2 42 the general rule applies that his innocence is unim-
portant in a voluntary transfer,'2 4 but becomes important when
there is a valuable consideration.2 4. Badges of fraud, expressly re-
236 Partridge v.. Gopp, 2 Amb. 595 (Ch. 1758); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra
note 28; §§ 234, 250; BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 80.
2 37 1n re Johnson, 20 Ch. D. 289, 392 (1881); Midleton v. Pollock, 2 Ch.
D. 104, 108 (1876); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra, note 28, §§ 234, 250, 295. Notice,
actual or constructive, of the grantor's intent is sufficient. Manwaring v.
O'Brien, 75 Minn. 542, 78 N. W. 1 (1899); Kansas Moline Plow Co. v. Sher-
man, 3 Okla. 204, 41 Pac. 623 (1895). See Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 348,
394 (U. S. 1833).
-38Ray v. Simons, 76 Ind. 150 (1881); Walker v. Burrows, I Atk. 93
(Ch. 1745); Bmvp, op. cit. supra note 3, § 33. See 2 MOORE, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 608.
239 Supra note 148. See also Miller v. Wilson, 15 Ohio 108, 115 (1846);
Friedel v. Wolfle, 41 Ohio App. 564, 180 N. E. 738 (1931).
240 Notes 139-141 supra. See Bobilya v. Priddy, 68 Ohio St. 373, 67 N. E.
736 (1903) (REv. STAT. § 6343); Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio 469, 482 (1824)
(predecessor to General Code Section 8618); Friedel v. Wolfle, 41 Ohio App.
564, 180 N. E. 738 (1931); Underwood v. Lapp, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 582 (1939);
Gould v. Cooper, 15 Ohio App. 223, 32 Ohio C. A. 241 (1919); Hamill v.
Wright, 5 Ohio N. P. 9, 8 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 467 (1897).
241 See notes 220-223 supra.
2 The Uniform Act, Section 7, like Ohio General Code, Section 8618,
but unlike the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, does not specifically save a transfer
because of the grantee's good faith. Cf. UNrFoim FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
ACT § 9.
2
- Hersh v. Levinson Bros., 117 N. J. Eq. 131, 174 Atl. 736 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1934); In re Rasmussen's Estate, 238 Wis. 334, 298 N. W. 172 (1941).
244 Drury v. State Capital Bank, 163 Md. 84, 161 Atl. 176 (1932); Hersh
v. Levinson Bros., supra note 243; Queen-Favorite Bldg. Assoc. v. Burstein,
310 Pa. 219, 165 Atl. 13 (1933). See Heller, Colorable Transfers, Fraudulent
Conveyances, and Preferences in State and Federal Liquidation Proceedings.
[1939] Wis. L. REV. 360, 368.
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jected as presumptions, remain as evidence of the state of mind. -2 4 5
The section adopts the Massachusetts rule, and extends its remedy
to subsequent creditors even though they were not within the
grantor's contemplation.4 This provision would change Ohio law.
CONVEYANCES OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
When not complicated by the fact of insolvency or by the
special doctrines of insufficient capital or of an intention to incur
future debts, there is no inherent wrong in the voluntary convey-
ance of partnership assets to a partner,247 or to the consensual use of
such assets to pay a partrier's individual debts.248 When insolvency
is present, however, problems arise concerning the so-called aggre-
gate and entity theories of partnerships.2 49  Since partners may
waive the rule that firm creditors shall be preferred out of firm
assets,2 50 the use of firm assets to pay a partner's debt is held by
some courts to create simply a preference at common law.2 51 By
others such a transfer is classed as a fraud upon creditors 52-a view
245 The following have been considered as evidence of fraudulent
intent: Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U. S. 348 (1932) (formation of a corporation
so that a receiver may be appointed); Wilson v. Robinson, 83 F. 2d 397
(C. C. A. 2d 1936) (grossly inadequate considerations); Lackawanna Pants
Mfg. Co. v. Wiseman, 133 F. 2d 482, 486 (C. C. A. 6th 1943); Oakford Realty
Co. v. Boarman, 156 Md. 65, 143 Atl. 644 (1828) (false representations);
Anderson v. Chapman, 215 Mich. 80, 183 N. W. 908 (1921) (secret option
to repurchase). See Timmer v. Pietrzyk, 272 Mich. 238, 261 N. W. 313
(1935) (act not cited).
246 McLaughlin, Application of The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, 46 1-ARv. L. REV. 404, 430 (1933); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, §§ 324,
326; But cf. Oakford Realty Co. v. Boarman, 156 Md. 65, 143 Atl. 644 (1928);
Neeb v. Atlantic Mill & Lumber Co., 176 Md. 297, 5 A. 2d 283, 287 (1939).
2
4 Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Ves. 119 (1801); BATES, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP
§§ 559, 560 (1888); Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations,
42 HARv. L. REV. 977, 997 (1929). See Darby v. Gilligan, 33 W. Va. 246,
10 S. E. 400 (1889).
24BEllison v. Lucas and McDuffie, 87 Ga. 223, 13 S. E. 445 (1891);
Woodmansie v. Holcomb, 34 Kan. 35, 7 Pac. 603 (1885). See CRANE, PART-
NERSHIPS 177 (1938).
24 CRANE, id. § 3; BATES, LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS §§ 170-179 (1888);
MECHEI, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 6 (2d ed. 1920); Cowles,
The Firm as a Legal Person, 57 CENT. L. J. 343 (1903).
-o MECHEM, id. § 436; CRANE, id. at 179.
2 5, First National Bank of Indianola v. Brubaker, 128 Iowa 587, 105
N. W. 116 (1905); Goddard-Peck Grocery Co. v. McCune, 122 Mo. 426, 25
S. W. 904 (1898); Sargent v. Blake, 160 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 8th 1908); Crane,
The Uniform Partnership Act, A Criticism, 28 HARv. L. REV. 762, 775-776
(1915); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 219.
252 Bank v. Durfey, 72 Miss. 971, 18 So. 456 (1895); 1 BATES, op. cit.
supra note 249, § 566; CRANE, Op. cit. supra note 248, at 179-180.
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that is more clearly demonstrable under the entity theory. - 3
A further complication occurs when firm assets are transferred
to a partner who assumes the firm debts. In this case some courts,
following the aggregate theory, consider the assumption of debts
as properly supporting the transfer.2 54 Others call it a fraudulent
conveyance, with or without resort to the entity theory. 55
In Ohio a conveyance of firm assets to a partner's creditor is
classed as preferential but not necessarily as fraudulent, 256 and a
conveyance to a partner upon assumption of firm debts is not im-
proper. 57
The Uniform Act proposes in Section 8 that:
Every conveyance of partnership property and every
partnership obligation incurred when the partnership is or
will be thereby rendered insolvent, is fraudulent as to part-
nership creditors, if the conveyance is made or obligation is
incurred, (a) To a partner, whether with or without a
promise by him to pay partnership debts, or (b) To a per-
son not a partner without fair consideration 258 to the part-
nership as distinguished from consideration to the individ-
ual partners.
2 -55
253 Roop v. Herron, 15 Neb. 73, 17 N. W. 353 (1883); Dodd, Dogma and
Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 HARV. L. REV. 977, 997 (1929);
MECaEMi, op. cit. supra note 249, §§ 443, 444; 39 HARv. L. REV. 247, 249 (1925).
25
'In re Suprenant, 217 Fed. 470 (N. D. N. Y. 1914). Assumption of
debts is not always held requisite. "In accordance with the general rule
before stated, it has been steadily held that one partner may in good faith
convey his interest in partnership assets to another, and that thereby all
equities of such partner and of all partnership creditors to subject such
assets first to the payment of their claims is thereby lost." Wiggins v.
Blackshear, 86 Tex. 665, 26 S. W. 939, 940 (1894). MECVEM, op. cit. supra
note 249, § 447.
255 Because of insolvency the consideration fails and the transfer is
voluntary. Darby v. Gilligan, 33 W. Va. 246, 10 S. E. 400 (1889); Prior lien
of creditors held not to be divested. Peyser v. Myers, 135 N. Y. 599, 32 N. E.
699 (1892). See Ex parte Mayou, 4 DeG. J. & S. 664 (1865). The general
problem of partnership transactions as fraudulent conveyances is discussed:
Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act, A Criticism, 28 HARv. L. REV. 762,
774-776 (1915); Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr.
Crane's Criticism, 29 HARv. L. REV. 158, 291, 296-298 (1915); Dodd, Dogma
and Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 HARV. L. REV. 977, 997 (1929); 1
BATES, op. cit. supra note 249, §§ 562, 568.
256 Sigler v. Knox County Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511 (1858); Citizen's Nat.
Bank v. Wehrle, 18 Ohio C. C. 535, 9 Ohio C. D. 330 (1897), aff'd without
opinion, 61 Ohio St. 654, 57 N. E. 1131 (1899).
257Miller v. Estill, 5 Ohio St. 508, 517 (1856); Pfirrman v. Koch, 13
Ohio Dec. Rep. 660 (1871).
258 Liebowitz v. Arrow Roofing Co., 259 N. Y. 391, 182 N. E. 58 (1932).
See Hartnett v. Doyle, 16 Tenn. App. 302, 64 S. W. 2d 227 (1932).
259 It is not clear to what extent the grantee is obliged to assure him-
self that the consideration paid shall benefit the partnership rather than the
individual partners. See 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 10, at 321; CRAE, op.
cit. supra note 248, at 180, 183; 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, §216. In sub-
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These provisions would change the law in Ohio. Further, it
should be recalled that while Section 2 defines partnership insol-
vency upon the aggregate theory, Section 8 treats the firm as an
entity insofar as fraudulent conveyances are concerned. 2 0  The
phrasing of subsection (a) should also be noted. Its terms are
broad enough to ban a cash sale of goods for equal value by an in-
solvent partnership to one of its members-a proposal which is
remarkable if true, inasmuch as a transfer for equivalent value
would be involved.2 0 1
MATURED AND UNMATURED CLAIMS
Distinguished from the rights of present and subsequent credi-
tors under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth is the availability of remedies,
dependent upon the maturity of the claim and its reduction to judg-
ment. Ordinarily before equity will set aside a fraudulent convey-
ance,2 62 it requires the claim to be in judgment. 6 3 Statutes in some
states have changed this rule,264 but not in the case of tort claims.2-65
stance the definition is adopted in Section 67d (4) of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U. S. C. § 107d(4) (1946).
260 See note 91 supra.
261 This section "declares fraudulent, as to partnership creditors, any
transfer of partnership assets or any partnership obligation incurred (a)
to a partner... .": 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 10, at 315; CRANE, op. cit.
supra note 248, at 180-183; 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 219.
262 Wiggins v. Armstrong, 2 Johns. Ch. 144 (N. Y. 1816); Fleming v.
Grafton, 54 Miss. 79 (1876); Wadsworth v. Schisselbauer, 32 Minn. 84, 19
N. W. 390 (1884); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 85; 42 YALE L. J. 288
(1932). Subsidiary problems are indicated: necessity for exhausting legal
remedies, 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 770; 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note
28, §§ 67, 86; sufficiency of a foreign judgment, 2 MoonR, id. at 780-782; need
for a lien, 2 MooRE, id. at 802-805, BUMP, op. cit. supra note 3, at 535, 34
A. S. R. 855; existence of a lien as excusing lack of judgment, 2 MooRE, op.
cit. supra note 15, at 782-785; county in which execution should be served,
23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 64; insolvency or non-residence as excusing lack of
judgment, White v. Exchange Nat. Bank, 172 Okla. 331, 44 P. 2d 935 (1937);
Humphrey v. McCleary, 159 Minn. 535, 198 N. W. 132 (1924); 2 MooRE, op.
cit. supra note 15, at 787; or when the grantor is deceased, 103 A.L.R. 555,
23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 92; need for resort to other assets or to sue joint obligors,
2 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 805, 808; effect of death of grantee, 25 VA.
L. REV. 232 (1938).
263 In England a simple contract creditor may have a fraudulent con-
veyance set aside, but a judgment is necessary if property is to be applied
to satisfaction of a debt. Reese River Silver Mining Co. v. Atwell, L.R. 7
Eq. 347 (1869); MacDonald v. McCall, 9 Ont. L. R. 185 (1885); Angell v.
Draper, 1 Vern. 398 (1686); Colman v. Croker, 1 Ves. 160 (1790). Cf. MAY,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 527.
26
'Bromberg v. Heyer, 69 Ala. 22 (1881); Phelps v. Smith, 116 Ind.
387, 17 N.E. 602 (1888). See Cocks v. Varney, 45 N.J. Eq. 72, 17 Atl. 108
(Ch. 1889); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28 §§ 79, 80. 85.
265 Nelson v. Smith, 157 Ore. 292, 69 P. 2d 1072 (1937), 24 VA. L. REV.
197 (1937); 6 Miss. L. J. 279 (1934); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 81.
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Remedy is in the alternative of levy and sale,2 6 or as suggested,
in equity to set- aside the transfer..2 67 An action for damages against
the grantee is sometimes proper.268  Since a fraudulent transfer is
usually valid between the parties,2 69 the surplus over that needed to
pay debts belongs to the grantee or donee;270 and when the consid-
eration is valuable but inadequate, equity treats the property so
conveyed as security to the extent of the amount actually paid.27 1
In Ohio when an action is brought under Sections 11104-11106
"for the equal benefit of the creditors," it is immaterial whether
the petitioner's claim "has matured or will thereafter mature." 272
Cf. 43 W. VA. L. Q. 225 (1937). Some states, including Ohio [Smith v. Buck
119 Ohio St. 101, 162 N.E. 382 (1928,)] will allow attachment in this case.
OHo GEN. CODE § 11819 (1938). But under the fraudulent conveyance stat-
utes, the tort claimant in Ohio must first proceed to judgment. Sechrist v.
Veres, 9 Ohio Op. 492 (C.P. 1937).206 The basis for this is that the conveyance is void. Gooch's Case,
3 Co. 121, 5 Co. 60a (1559); 2 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 731, 739;
BumP, op. cit. supra note 3, at 530. Not all courts so hold. Cf. Foley v.
Ruley, 50 W. Va. 158, 40 S.E. 382 (1901); Eckert v. Wendel, 120 Tex. 618,
40 S.W. 2d 796 (1931). For difficulties and limitations see 1 GLENN, op. Cit.
supra note 28, §§ 69n, 239, 239a. Re attachment of grantee's estate. 1 GLENN,
id. at 162a.2 7 BumP, op. cit. supra note 3, § 532; 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 15, at
758. As to injunctions and receiverships: 90 Am. Dec. 296 (1886); UNiFoRm
FuDuLE= CONVEYANcE ACT § 10; 2 MOORE, id. at 1045-1050.
?68 Murtha v. Curley, 90 N.Y. 372 (1882); 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note
15 at 756. Cf. 1 GLENN, op cit. supra note 28, § 74; 18 COL. L. REV. 363 (1918);
24 VA. L. REV. 795 (1937); 27 HARV. L. REV. 181 (1913).26 8Radin, Fraudulent, Conveyances in California and the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 27 CAliF. L. REV. 1, 11 (1939). Cf. attorney
and client, Ford v. Harrington, 16 N.Y. 285 (1857). See note 7 supra.
2 7oBurtch v. Elliot, 3 Ind. 99 (1851); Wood v. Hunt, 38 Barb. 302 (N.Y.
1862).
271 BUMp, op. cit. supra note 3, § 532. See 27 VA. L. REv. 1062, 1063
(1941); Harris, Some Aspects of Fraudulent Conveyances in Alabama, 6
ALA. LAw. 170, 172 (1945). The grantee may not so use the property if
actual fraud is involved. Re fraudulent grantee's expenditures for neces-
sary repairs, taxes, payment of incumbrances see Loos v. Wilkinson, 113
N.Y. 485, 21 N.E. 392 (1889); 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, §§ 243-259. But
if the transfer was for full value and bona fide, the conveyance is valid.
Harrods, Ltd. v. Stanton, 1 K.B. 516 (1923).
272 "Any creditor or creditors, as to whom any of the acts or things
prohibited in the next four preceding sections are void, whether the claim
of such creditor or creditors has matured or will thereafter mature, may
commence an action . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) OHmO GEN. CODE § 11106
(1938). For actions under Revised Statutes 6343, predecessor of Ohio Gen-
eral Code Sections 11104-11106, see Combs v. Watson, 32 Ohio St. 228
(1877); The Gem City Acetylene Generator Co. v. Coblentz, 86 Ohio St. 199,
99 N.E. 302 (1912); Bloomingdale v. Stein, 42 Ohio St. 168 (1884). Cf.
Hegler v. Grove, 63 Ohio St. 404, 59 N.E. 162 (1900). Legal remedies are
also available. The land may be attached. Gormley v. Potter, 29 Ohio St.
597 (1876); Bailey v. Swain, 45 Ohio St. 657, 16 N.E. 370 (1888). And it is
1948]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
No such statement is contained in Section 8618, and unless the
quoted provision of Section 11106 is applicable to an action under
Section 8618, the ordinary requirement of judgment would seem to
apply.2
78
As under the Statute of Elizabeth, so in Ohio for creditors or
their representatives to set aside a fraudulent conveyance 274 injury
must be shown..2 7 5 A surety is classed as a creditor,276 but an un-
liquidated-tort claimant is not.27 7 Purchasers for value and in good
faith from the grantor 278 or grantee 279 are protected, and the remedy
subject to the lien of a judgment against the grantor. "If a debtor alien
his lands, with the intent, and for the purpose of defrauding his creditors,
such alienation, as against such creditors, is void, and the estate is con-
sidered as remaining in the debtor for all purposes beneficial to the creditor.
It may be attached, if the debtor absconds; is subject to the lien of a judg-
ment; and is in every way liable to be appropriated to the payment of the
creditor, in the same manner as if no conveyance had been made." Barr v.
Hatch, 3 Ohio 527, 530 (1828).273 In Pennell v. Walker, 68 Ohio App. 533, 36 N.E. 2d 150 (1941), the
court assumed the applicability of Ohio General Code Section 11106 to an
action under Section 8618, but held that prior to judgment a recipient of
personal injuries was not a creditor under its provisions. The restrictive
wording of Section 11106 (note 272 supra) was not discussed. Allen v. Toth,
22 Ohio L. Abs. 457 (App. 1935) held that lack of knowledge as a defense
under Section 11105 was not available in an action to set aside a gift under
Section 8618. The court said at page 462, "Sec. 8618 G. C. is not limited by
the provisions of Sec. 11105 G. C. or any other statutory enactment."
(Emphasis supplied.) For similar statements regarding the defense of Ohio
General Code Section 11105 see Blackford v. Gaynor, 50 Ohio App. 494, 198
N.E. 736 (1934); Huwe v. Knecht, 10 Ohio App. 487 (1919); State ex Tel.
Fulton v. Loar, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 156 (App. 1934).274 Re creditors see Ohio General Code Section 11104. Under Ohio
General Code Section 8618 or its predecessors see Burgett v. Burgett, 1
Ohio 469 (1824); Westerman v. Westerman, 25 Ohio St. 500, 509 (1874);
Gormnley v. Potter, 29 Ohio St. 597 (1876). As to representatives of creditors
see Sayle v. Guarantee Savings & Loan Co., 2 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 401, 25 Ohio
C.D. 503 (1904), af'd without opinion, 72 Ohio St. 639, 76 N.E. 1125 (1905).
Ordinarily a creditor may not sue after appointment of an assignee. Hollo-
well & Co. v. Bayliss, 10 Ohio St. 536 (1860); Cornell v. Sulter, 3 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 570, 13 Ohio C.D. 384 (1901). Cf. OHio GEN. CODE § 11107 (1938).
But the authority granted to a deceased debtor's personal representative
[OHio GEN. CODE § 10510-49 (1938)] to set aside fraudulent conveyances
of land does not prevent suits by creditors. Hause v. Coblentz, 22 Ohio App.
17, 153 N.E. 255 (1926); Hoffman v. Kiefer, 19 Ohio C.C. 401, 10 Ohio C.D.
304 (1899). See note 43 supra.
275 See Wright v. Snell, 22 Ohio C.C. 86, 12 Ohio C.D. 308 (1901). This
is the ordinary rule. 1 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 84.2 7 6 Kerber v. Ruff, 3 Ohio N.P. 165, 4 Ohio C.D. 406 (1896).
27 7 Pennell v. Walker, 68 Ohio App. 533, 36 N.E. 2d 150 (1941); 28 VA.
L. REV. 95 (1941); Sechrist v. Veres, 9 Ohio Op. 492 (C.P. 1937). See notes
45-47, 68 supra.2 7 8Bobilya v. Priddy, 68 Ohio St. 373, 67 N.E. 736 (1903); Hamill v.
Wright, 5 Ohio N.P. 9, 10, 8 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 467 (1898).
279 Holmes v. Gardner, 50 Ohio St. 167, 33 N.E. 644 (1893).
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against the grantee is available regardless of other property of the
debtor,281 or of a remedy against a surety.2 81
Section 9 of the Uniform Act provides:
Rights of Creditors Whose Claims Have Matured.-(1)
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a credi-
tor, such creditor, when his claim has matured, may, as
against any person except a purchaser for fair consideration
without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase,
or one who has derived title immediately or mediately from
such a purchaser, 282
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled
to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim, 283 or
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execu-
tion upon the property conveyed.284
(2) A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has
given less than a fair consideration for the conveyance or
obligation, may retain the property or obligation as security
for repayment. 28 5
Under these provisions it has been held that a creditor or his
representative 28 6 must show that he has been prejudiced by the
280 Gormley v. Potter, 29 Ohio St. 597 (1876); Westerman v. Wester-
man, 25 Ohio St. 500 (1874). Goods and chattels must be exhausted first.
O~ro GEN. CODE § 11666 (1938); Gormley v. Potter, supra. Concerning
actions by an executor under Ohio General Code Section 10510-49 see notes
43 and 274 supra.
281 Vilas v. Christopher, 33 Ohio L. Rep. 589, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 521 (1930).
Nor is an execution returned nulla bona necessary. Ibid.
282 This is considered to include the transferee of either the fraudulent
grantor or fraudulent grantee. Bryan v. Wilson, 171 Md. 421, 189 At. 220
(1937). See Nagel v. Farmers Exchange, 64 S.D. 363, 266 N.W. 722 (1936);
Angers v. Sabatinelli, 235 Wis. 422, 293 N.W. 173 (1940). The protection
afforded to a "purchaser for fair consideration without notice of the fraud"
has been held to include an attaching creditor of the grantee. In re Max-
well Sheraton, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 680 (S.D. N.Y. 1942), af'd sub nom., City of
New York v. Johnson, 137 F. 2d 163 (C.C.A. 2d 1943). See Lowenthal v.
Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 114 N.J. Eq. 375, 168 Atl. 857 (Ch. 1933); 20
NoTE Dmvn LAw. 438 (1945).
2 8 3 Healy-Owen-Hartzill Co. v. Montevideo Farmers & Merchants Ele-
vator Co., 170 Minn. 290, 212 N.W. 455 (1927); Baker v. Penecost, 220 Tenn.
529, 106 S.E. 2d 220 (1937). As between the parties the conveyance is good.
Brill v. Foshay Co., 65 F. 2d 420 (C.C.A. 8th 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
643 (1933); Bankers Trust Co. v. Bank of Rockville Center Trust Co., 114
N.J. Eq. 391, 168 Atl. 733 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933); Marshall v. Marshall, 230
Wis. 504, 284 N.W. 541 (1939).
2 8 Doland v. Burns Lumber Co., 156 Minn. 238, 194 N.W. 636 (1923).
285 In re Spotless Tavern Co., 4 F. Supp. 752 (D. Md. 1933); Merchants'
Discount Co. v. Esther Abelson, Inc., 297 Mass. 517, 9 N.E. 2d. 528 (1937);
People's Savings & Dime Bank & Trust Co. v. Scott, 303 Pa. 294, 154 Atl. 489
(1931). See 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 259.
286 Michal v. Adair, 66 Cal. App. 2d 382, 152 P. 2d 490 (1944); Ameri-
can Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 177 N.E. 783 (1929).
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transfer. 8 7 Judgment and lien are not a prerequisite, 28 8 but the
claim must be matured, and the security of a secured creditor must
be insufficient..
2 89
In contrast with the remedies granted to the holder of a ma-
tured claim, the Statute of Elizabeth offered no aid to the holder
of an unmatured one.290 In some states this defect has been cor-
rected by legislation.2 9 1 Section 10 of the Uniform Act meets the
situation by providing that:
Rights of Creditors Whose Claims Have Not Matured.
-Where a conveyance made or obligation incurred is fraud-
ulent as to a creditor whose claim has not matured he may
proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction against any
person against whom he could have proceeded had his claim
matured, and the court may,
(a) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property,
(b) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the property,
(c) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation, or
247 Brill v. Foshay Co., supra note 283; Hemphill Co. v. Davis Knitting
Co., 114 Pa. Super. 94, 173 Atl. 704 (1934).
288 American Surety Co. v. Conner, supra note 286; Lind v. Johnson
Co., 204 Minn. 30, 383 N.W. 661 (1938); Virgil State Bank v. Wahl, 56 S.D.
218, 228 N.W. 392 (1930); Glenn, The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
-Rights of Creditors without Judgment, 30 COL. L. REv. 202 (1930); 29
COL. L. REV. 529 (1929); 42 H-Lv. L. REv. 832 (1929); 28 MxcH. L. REV. 206
(1929). Cf. Lyman v. Manger, 185 Wis. 63, 200 N.W. 663 (1924). New Jer-
sey changed the wording of the Uniform Act in this section so that it now
reads in part, '"When such creditor's claim is established according to law
or is a lien upon the property covered by such conveyance or upon such
obligation, [such creditor may] have the conveyance set aside or the obli-
gation annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim." Thus New
Jersey has held that a judgment is required, but the bill will be retained
and injunctive relief granted pending the determination of the amount of
the claim. Letitsky v. Wirzes, 109 N.J. Eq. 25, 156 Atl. 272 (Ch. 1931);
Harder v. Harder, 113 N.J. Eq. 540, 168 AtI. 61 (Ch. 1933). See Ohio v.
Clarke, 129 N.J. Eq. 344, 19 A. 2d 893 (Ch. 1941) (action dismissed, no juris-
diction over principal debtor). The basis for the above change in New
Jersey seems to be the separation of the law and equity courts, New Jersey
having held the Act unconstitutional insofar as it attempts to authorize
action to upset a conveyance without the existence of a lien. Horstmann
Co. v. Tothfuss, 128 N.J. Eq. 168, 15 A. 2d 623 (Ct. Err & App. 1941);
Nield v. Norris, 130 N.U. Eq. 53, 21 A. 2d 153 (Ch. 1941); 1 GLENN, op. cit.
supra note 28, § 82.
289 See Marshall & Elsley Bank v. Stepke, 228 Wis. 39, 279 N.W. 625
(1938).
290 Wiggins v. Armstrong, 2 Johns. Ch. 144 (N.Y. 1816); Price v. Engle,
77 Ind. App. 439, 133 N.E. 755 (1922); Kautz v. Sheridan, 118 Me. 28, 105
Atl. 401 (1919); BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 152.
291 E. g. OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 11104-11106 (1938). Under Section 11104,
when a conveyance is upset as fraudulent, all creditors, including those
with unmatured claims, may share. See Note, 24 VA. L. REv. 795 (1938);
1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, §§ 62, 78, 82.
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(d) Make any order which the circumstances of the case
may require.
2 92
Thus in Sections 9 and 10 the Act provides remedies for the
holder of a matured or an unmatured claim, leaving to earlier sec-
tions the rights of present and subsequent creditors. Since the
definition of a creditor in Section 1 includes the holder of an un-
liquidated, ex delicto claim, Sections 9 and 10 293 are more inclusive
than the Ohio statutes. Under Section 9 or 10 respectively, it is
possible to join an action upon a matured or unmatured claim with
one to set aside a fraudulent conveyance.2 94 Indeed, the inclusion
of a tort claimant as a creditor under Section 1, the clarifying of a
simple creditor's rights to sue in Sections 9 and 10,295 the provisions
involving partnerships in Section 8, and the treatment of subsequent
creditors in Sections 5, 6 and 7290 are seemingly the most important
improvements which the Act has to offer in Ohio.
CONSTRUCTION AND KiNDRED MATTERS
Section 12 of the Uniform Act provides that "This Act shall be
so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform 297 the law of those states which adopt it." In this
292This seems to indicate that the action to be taken is within the
discretion of the court. "The court may choose to go no further, until judg-
ment in the first action, than to restrain the defendant from disposing of
the property alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed, and appoint a
receiver. It has the power to 'make any order which the circumstances of
the case may require.'" Herring-Curtiss Co. v. Curtiss, 140 Misc. 857, 252
N.Y. Supp. 106 (Sup. Ct. 1931). Re receiverships see Chapiro v. Wilgus, 287
U.S. 348 (1932).
293 Although sections 9 and 10 are stated in terms of maturity or im-
maturity of the claim, the remedies of Section 10 seem to be available if
the claim, though matured, is unliquidated. Oliphant v. Moore, 155 Tenn.
359, 293 S.W. 541 (1927) (malicious prosecutions); Gatto v. Boyd, 137 Misc.
156, 241 N.Y. Supp. 626 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (personal injuries); McCann v.
Oberle, 33 Del. Co. 61 (Pa. 1945) (personal injuries).
294
-American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783 (1929).
For discussion of constitutional difficulties re jury trial, see note 288 supra.
Re procedure under Federal.Rule 18 b see 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28,
§§81, 82.
293 See note 273 swpra.
296The inclusion of subsequent creditors in sections 5 and 6 would
probably be more a change in form than in substance.
297 Interpretations in other states are applicable. State v. Brooks, 181
Minn. 262, 232 N.W. 331 (1930); In re Keilner's Estate, 11 N.J. Misc. 201, 165
Atl. 585 (Surr. Ct. 1932); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Nadler, 115
Ohio St. 472, 154 N.E. 736 (1926). See Kerr, Nature and Interpretation of
Uniform State Laws, 55 Am. L. Ray. 105, 107 (1921); Sickerman, Construc-
tion of Clause in Uniform State Laws Providing for Uniformity of Interpre-
tation, 2 A.B.A.J. 60 (1916). But this doctrine has limits. In re Frey, 15 F.
2d 871 (Minn. 1926); Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 303 Mass. 275, 21 N.E. 2d
244 (1939).
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connection the Commissioners' statement should be recalled: "In
most states the bill if enacted will not so much change the law as
clearly define what heretofore has been indefinite."2 8  Despite al-
teration in form the Act is mainly a modernized Statute of 13
Elizabeth,299 proposed in order "to remove some confusion of legal
thought" and to substitute therefor "rules both certain and uni-
form"30°--objectives not unworthy, however sanguine. Since its
purpose is remedial, 301 its construction should be liberal.302
Further to insure that enactment of the Uniform Act will not
disturb established rules, Section 11 directs that: "In any case not
provided for in this Act the rules of law and equity including the
law merchant, and in particular the rules relating to the law of
principal and agent, and the effect of fraud, misrepresentation, dur-
ess or coercion, mistake, bankruptcy or other invalidating cause
shall govern. '1311
This provision was said to preserve existing doctrine 304 when a
grantor was defrauded of property by his grantee,305 and was applied
298 9 UNIFoRm LAWS ANN. PREFATORY NOTE 326 (1938).
299 See note 11 supra.
300 See note 12 supra.
301 Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano, 283 N.Y. 139, 27 N.E. 2d 814 (1940);
Lind v. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30 282 N.W. 661 (1939). See Angers
v. Sabatinelli, 235 Wis. 423, 293 N.W. 173 (1940).
302 American Surety Co. v. Conner, 225 App. Div. 137, 232 N.Y. Supp.
94, rev'd on other grounds, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 785 (1929). "The latter
[the Uniform Act] is very much like a document under the parole evidence
rule; so long as you do not contradict anything it says, you should be per-
mitted to suggest various points which it has not covered." 1 GLENN, op. Cit.
supra note 28, at 564-565.
303 Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348 (1932); In re Frey, supra note 297;
Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, supra note 297; Golder v. Gogash, 325 Pa. 449,
188 Atl. 837 (1937).
30 1 "Although the doctrine of fraudulent retention of possession has
been developed historically in connection with the Statute of Elizabeth, it
has become a separate body of law with a great diversity of rules in the
various jurisdictions. Any attempt to treat this question would probably
have unduly impeded the adoption of the Uniform Act. At any rate, it
seems to be assumed without exception that conveyances may stand or fall
according to the local law of fraudulent retention of possession without
reference to the Fraudulent Conveyance Act." McLaughlin, Application of
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 HARv. L. REv. 404, 405 (1933).
305 As between the parties, the "clean hands" doctrine usually prevents
the grantor of a fraudulent conveyance from recovering from the grantee.
Asher v. Asher, 278 Ky. 802, 129 S.W. 2d 552 (1939). However, when the
grantee was the primary moving party the grantor has been allowed to
recover. Asher v. Asher, supra; or when no injury has come to the creditors
of the grantor. Zak v. Zak, 305 Mass. 194, 25 N.E. 2d 169 (1940) (allowed
recovery on the basis that the grantor did not have to rely upon the fraud
to show his claim against the grantee); 44 YALE L. J. 173 (1934); 24 MINN.
L. REV. 872 (1940). See Severn v. Boylan, 75 Ohio App. 15, 60 N.E. 2d 251
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in the second federal circuit to an assignment of book accounts.306
The Act is cumulative.0 7 It prescribes no exclusive course of pro-
cedure.308 Ordinary statutes of limitations are applicable.30 9 And
even though a judgment is no longer necessary,31 0 on the cumulative
theory it has been held that limitations run from the date of judg-
ment, if that was the law under previous statutes.3 11
Further to be considered upon adoption of the Act would be its
effect on existing legislation. Section 14 312 provides the vehicle for
specific repeal, including the provision that "all acts or parts of acts
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed." As a precautionary
measure some states have specifically reserved from repeal certain
sections of their codes.3 13
If the Ohio Legislature should adopt the Uniform Act, Section
8618 314 of the Code should be directly repealed. In addition it might
(1944); Schmelz v. Michelson, 8 Ohio Dec. Rep. 538 (1882); 1 GLENN, op.
cit. supra note 28, § 119. Rule extended to creditor of grantee. California
Conserving Co. v. D'Avenzo, 62 F. 2d 528 (C.C.A. 2d 1933). This doctrine ap-
parently is not changed by the Uniform Act. In re Baltimore Shoe House,
20 F. 2d 134 (D. Md. 1927); In re Krauss & Co., 2 F. 2d 999 (W. D. Tenn.
1924).
301 Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co., 54 F. 2d 518 (C.C.A. 2d 1931); 18
VA. L. REv. 799 (1932); 41 YALE L. J. 924 (1932). See Irving Trust Co. v.
Finance Service Co., 63 F. 2d 694 (C.C.A. 2d 1933); In re DeLuxe Oil Co., 36
F. Supp. 287 (D. Minn. 1940); 4 COLLiER, op. cit. supra note 10, § 70.77.
307 Simon v. Sorrentino, 145 Pa. Super. 364, 20 A. 2d 805 (1941).
308 Schline v. Kine, 301 Pa. 586, 152 Atl. 845 (1930); Citizen's State
Bank v. Carda, 47 S.D. 29, 195 N.W. 828 (1923); Lind v. Johnson Co., supra
note 301; Conemaugh Iron Works Co. v. Delano, 298 Pa. 182, 148 Atl. 94
(1929); Lipsky v. Voloshen, 155 Md. 139, 141 A. 402 (1928).
309 1 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 28, § 88. New York uses different rules
for actual and legal fraud. In the former, the statutory period is six years
from the discovery of the fraud; in the latter the period is ten years from
the conveyance. Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jane, supra note 301; Buttles v.
Smith, 281 N.Y. 226, 22 N.E. 2d 350 (1939). Ohio has a limitation of four
years, running from date of discovery of the fraud. OHIo GEN. CODE § 11224;
Stivens v. Summers, 68 Ohio St. 421, 67 N.E. 884 (1903); Gombs v. Watson,
32 Ohio St. 228 (1877).
310 Note 288 swpra.
311 With the adoption of the Uniform Act, it would seem that the
statute would begin to run either upon the discovery of the fraud or from
date of the conveyance; but Minnesota in Lind v. Johnson Co., supra note
301, held that when a creditor proceeds to judgment before suing to set
aside, the statute begins to run when the judgment is rendered.
312Section 13 merely states, "This act may be cited as the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act."
313 E.g. Md.,dvinn., Pa. See McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act. 46 HARv. L. REv. 404 (1933).
314 Minnesota specifically repealed section 7013, the equivalent of Ohio
General Code Section 8618, yet allowed a creditor to obtain judgment and
then sue to set aside the conveyance, just as he could have done under the
previous statute. The court said that the Uniform Act did not upset the
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be advisable expressly to reserve Sections 11092 through 11145.
This would avoid any ambiguity regarding the effect of the Act
upon the law of assignments for creditors, discussed earlier.3 15 It
would include the Bulk Sales Act,316 which by construction would
probably be preserved in any event. And it would relieve any
doubt regarding the retention of Sections 11104 though 11107, with
their treatment of preferences as well as of fraudulent conveyances.
As a precaution Sections 8404 to 8408 and 8414 of the Sales Act,
relating to retention of possession and to transfers of title-although
probably beyond the strict scope of the Act 31 7-- and Section 8617 318
could also be specifically reserved.
On the other hand provisions of the insurance code relating to
distribution of proceeds from insurance policies procured in fraud
of creditors (9400) and to exemptions (9394) would seem to be
sufficiently reserved under Section 11 without special mention in
Section 14.31 9 The same would appear to be true of Sections 10502-6,
relative to dower rights in property conveyed in fraud of a spouse,320
and 10510-49 and -50,3 11 which authorize an executor or administrator
remedies available before adoption, since the Uniform Act did not contain
all the law on the subject. Lind v. Johnson Co., supra note 301. Utah
retained section 33-1-8, similar to Ohio General Code Section 8618.
315 Notes 23-26 supra.
3:16Omo GEN. CODE § 11102-11103-1. See McLLaughlin, Applica-
tion of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 HAV. L. REV. 404, 405
(1933), which points out that Del., Mich., N. J., Tenn., Wis., and Wyo. all
assumed the acts to be consistent; Minn. and Md. expressly saved the Bulk
Sales Act; Pennsylvania, in Miller v. Myers, 300 Pa. 192, 150 Atl. 588 (1930),
held the acts were consistent.
317 See 1 GLENN, Op. cit. supra note 28, §349; BANKR. ACT § 60; 24 MiN.
L. REV. 832, 844 (1940). "In many of the States in this country there are
statutory provisions covering the matter, and in all the older states the law
is well settled, and it would be hard to bring about a change. For this rea-
son it seemed best to the Commissioners for Uniform State Laws in consid-
ering this subject, not to attempt to make a uniform rule as to what con-
stitutes fraud, but to leave the matter to the law of each state. When the
existing local law determines what constitutes fraud this section of the
Sales Act provides the consequences which follow." WILLISTON, SALES
§ 351 (2d ed. 1924).
318 8 Ohio Laws 216 § 1 (1810), REV. STAT. § 4195 (1880) (which with
section 8618 formed subsections 1 and 2 of the Statute of Frauds).
319United States v. Bleser, 34 F. Supp. 653 (D. Wis. 1940); Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Hitchcock, 270 Mich. 72, 258
N.W. 214 (1935); Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 316 Pa. 316,
175 Atl. 400 (1934); First Wisconsin National Bank v. Roihling, 224 Wis. 316,
269 N.W. 677 (1936); 26 H.av. L. REv. 362 (1912); 25 VA. L. REv. 588 (1939).
320 See Dick v. Bauman, 73 Ohio App. 107, 55 N.E. 2d 137 (1943).
321 The Ohio statutes are collected note 6 supra.
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under certain conditions to set aside fraudulent conveyances.32 2
322 A repealer section might cover the following points:
14. Inconsistent Legislation Repealed. Section 8618 of the
General Code is hereby repealed, and all sections or parts of sec-
tions of the General Code which are inconsistent with this act are
hereby repealed; but sections 8404, 8405, 8406, 8617, and 11092 to
11145, inclusive, are not repealed.
Previous suggestions relating to restrictions in defining a conveyance
(note 31 supra) and insolvency (note 101 supra) should be recalled. New
York provided specifically, "This act shall not affect any action or proceed-
ing now pending in any court." Laws 1925, c. 254, sec. 1. Ohio General
Code Sections 11104-11106, as originally enacted in 1859, were held to be
retroactive. Stanton v. Sheldon & Co. v. Keyes, 14 Ohio St. 443 (1863).
